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Abstract
Drug reimportation has become a politically-appealing way to lower drug prices, which Americans commonly
perceive as too high. However, legalizing reimportation of U.S.-approved drugs raises major concerns about
safety and future research and development. The FDA task forces on reimportation and on preventing coun-
terfeit drugs provide a list of complicated measures that could address the safety question for a commercial
reimportation scheme. Moreover, by their support of reimportation, members of Congress have implicitly
demonstrated a willingness to forego a small amount of future innovation in return for increasing current
access. Nevertheless, reimportation does not fully meet the twin challenges of reforming American drug
consumption: increasing price transparency and comparative research on drug eﬀectiveness, which I call
scientiﬁc or medical transparency. These dual transparencies reward manufacturers with more innovative
products by paying them higher prices for their drugs. Transparency also helps drug purchasers to maximize
their negotiating power, allowing them to buy drugs of equivalent therapeutic value at lower prices. By
contrast, reimportation does nothing to increase medical transparency, it requires signiﬁcant start-up costs,
and its eﬀectiveness may be limited because drug companies will try to choke oﬀ the available supply of
1drugs. Therefore, while reimportation may relieve the burden of high drug prices for many Americans—and
while it represents a small step toward open price competition between drugs—it is an acceptable strategy
only in the absence of the political will to inject much-needed transparency into the $150 billion American
drug market.
Overview
Prescription drug reimportation has become a hot-button issue, taking a prominent role in the recent Presi-
dential elections and inspiring many proposed bills in Congress.1 Essentially, reimportation takes advantage
of the fact that many drugs are cheaper in foreign countries than in the U.S., so it saves out-of-pocket costs
for the patient at the end of the distribution chain. Hundreds of thousands of Americans have already en-
gaged in personal importation, which consists of individuals placing orders either in person or by telephone
or internet with pharmacies in other countries.
Critics of reimportation continually focus on two main issues. First, they warn that reimported drugs are
not as safe as drugs bought within traditional channels and undermine the current regulatory process, which
they refer to as the “gold standard.”2 As a result, avenues of entry may open for counterfeit drugs that are
1See Election 2004: What’s Next, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Nov. 4, 2004, at B2; proposed bills in the 109th
Congress include H.R. 328, 563, and 578 and S. 16, 109, and 184.
2I discuss a related issue, the diﬀerence between drug reimportation and drug importation, separately below. Essentially,
reimportation consists of the importation only of approved U.S. drug versions from other countries. Importation includes these
drugs and also versions unapproved by the U.S. but approved by foreign governments.
2not only ineﬀective but even dangerous. Second, opponents claim that reimportation may lower prices in
the short run but that drug companies will suﬀer decreased revenues and will respond by cutting research
and development (“R&D”). This may eventually lead to a decrease in the number of new, life-saving drugs.
Reimportation deﬁes clean categorization into even these two main areas of inquiry, mandating consideration
of torts and intellectual property (“IP”) law, public health, and pharmacoeconomics. Despite its common
practice and even encouragement by diﬀerent governmental bodies, reimportation today violates federal law
and continues mainly because of FDA’s exercise of enforcement discretion.3
Many consumer groups strongly endorse the legalization of reimportation as a way to save money, probably
based on the positive experiences that many Americans have had with personal reimportation to date. Reim-
portation also remains politically popular—the New York Times said that a “large majority” of Senators—
“up to 75 members, by some estimates”—in the last Senate would support reimportation.4 The support in
the Senate is bipartisan, and the Republican House passed a reimportation bill in 2003 over the President’s
opposition.5 Montana governor Brian Schweitzer argued that safety concerns about drugs from Canada were
“‘manufactured by American companies [and] are unfounded.”’6 He went on to point out that a top FDA
oﬃcial said “‘there has never been a single documented case of an unsafe prescription drug coming across
the border from Canada,”’ and he also cited a GAO report “‘reaﬃrming that prescription drugs purchased
from Canada are just as safe as those purchased in the U.S.”7 Even an executive from Pﬁzer, speaking for
himself, said that “‘stopping good importation bills has a high, high cost not just in money, but in American
3Examples of states supporting reimportation include Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, and New Hampshire.
See, e.g., Kris Hundley & Stephen Nohlgren, Global Drug Shuﬄe May Backﬁre, St. Petersburg Times, Oct. 7, 2004, at
A1. Maine is also interested in reimporting drugs from Canada, designating the Penobscot Indian Nation as the wholesale
distributor of the drugs to provide economic beneﬁts for the tribe. See Pam Belluck, Maine and One of Its Tribes Look to Buy
Canadian Drugs, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 2004, at A12.
4See Editorial, The Senate’s Chance on Drug Costs, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 2004, at A26.
5See id.
6AP, Democrats: Lift Ban on Buying Medicines From Canada, Feb. 26, 2005, at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/ALLPOLITICS/02/26/Dems.radio/index.html (last viewed Feb. 26, 2005).
7Id.
3lives.”’8
Furthermore, the decrease in R&D may not occur at all based on how PhRMA reacts to the decreased
revenue from the U.S. Drug companies might adjust their business models to maintain R&D funding, increase
revenue from other countries, or reprioritize R&D expenditures to minimize the harm of decreased R&D. It
is therefore possible but by no means certain that reimportation would have relatively little harmful impact
on the lives of Americans in the future, especially in comparison with the immediate beneﬁt of increased
access to aﬀordable pharmaceuticals. Otherwise, the R&D “imperative” becomes a self-sustaining creature,
with the end of drug development being more drug development and not beneﬁt to needy patients.
Assuming that the two main objections can be neutralized, the question still remains whether reimportation
is the best solution to the problem of high drug prices in the U.S. Reimportation might decrease prices and
improve patients’ care and quality of life, but the start-up costs of the safety and transactional apparatuses
needed could delay the beneﬁt for years. Also, reimportation does nothing to make sure that scientiﬁc
rationality governs drug spending. Additionally, some economists argue that there is no high price problem
despite public perception and multiple polls indicating otherwise.9 Drug spending is not inherently bad
because many drugs improve patients’ lives greatly and actually save costs in the health care system. It
is to be expected and is probably beneﬁcial overall that drug spending continues to increase—however,
that spending must be rational to maximize patient beneﬁt, provide value for the payer, and properly
incentivize the drug industry. Therefore, reimportation is acceptable but is not an intervention of choice,
despite its political popularity—it may be a way to increase price transparency in the drug market, but it is
an incomplete solution at best.
8Robert Pear, Insider Challenges Drug Industry on Imports, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2004, at A18.
9Fifty-seven percent of poll respondents said that drug prices are “unreasonably high” in one Harris Poll. See Gardiner
Harris, Drug Makers Seek to Mend Their Fractured Image, N.Y. Times, July 8, 2004, at C1.
4The optimal result would be for the debate about the strengths and weaknesses of reimportation to trigger
a new approach to drug consumption in the U.S. This would inject the cost-awareness inherent in reim-
portation into other parts of the drug production, prescribing, and consumption matrix. Greater economic
transparency would make purchasers, doctors, and patients aware of the price of drugs and their alterna-
tives. Just as importantly, scientiﬁc transparency from research comparing competing drugs head-to-head
allows selection of the drugs that provide the greatest health beneﬁt. Medical and price transparency should
become the driving forces for all public and private purchasing of drugs because transparency ultimately
improves patient health by making drug expenditures better, a far more important concern than whether
they are increasing or decreasing.
Part I. The Current Status of Importation
A. Legal Obstacles
As an attorney for the industry explained, Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (“FDCA”) § 501’s adulter-
ation provisions prevent manufacture under “unsanitary conditions” and require compliance with “‘current
good manufacturing practice”’ as a prerequisite for FDA approval.10 Furthermore, the § 502 misbranding
provisions prohibit “labeling that is false or misleading” or that lacks adequate warnings or directions.11
Section 505 requires a new drug to show proof of “safety and eﬀectiveness,” and approval is speciﬁc to
“the speciﬁc drug product identiﬁed in the application and manufactured in the facilities and according to
10Examining Prescription Drug Importation: A Review of a Proposal to Allow Third Parties to Reimport Prescription Drugs:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Health of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 71 (2002) (statement
by Peter Barton Hutt, attorney, PhRMA) [hereinafter Reimportation Hearings].
11Id.
5the speciﬁcations and procedures that are described in the application.”12 The application for approval to
market a new drug requires highly speciﬁc manufacturing details.13 Moreover, some foreign versions of a
drug may be unapproved in the U.S., making them ineligible for reimportation; others are identical to U.S.
versions but may lack information required on the U.S. label, which would require relabeling.14
Currently, FDCA prevents importation of unapproved, misbranded, and adulterated drugs.15 Additionally,
the 1987 Prescription Drug Marketing Act (“PDMA”) amended FDCA to prohibit reimportation “unless the
drug is imported by the manufacturer of the drug.”16 Congress has theoretically approved non-manufacturer
drug reimportation on two occasions. It ﬁrst did so with the Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000
(“MEDSA”), which amended FDCA by adding § 804, a section on reimportation.17 MEDSA required a drug
importer to inform HHS of the name and amount of active ingredient; date, quantity, origin, destination,
and price of the product; and manufacturer lot or control number.18 MEDSA left it up to the Secretary
of HHS to determine which countries could be eligible reimportation sites, and it allowed the Secretary
to suspend importation upon discovery of a violative pattern of importation.19 Drugs coming directly
from the ﬁrst foreign recipient required documentation of receipt, the amount received, proof of statistical
sampling and testing for authenticity, and certiﬁcation of U.S. approval and satisfaction of U.S. labeling
requirements.20 Drugs not coming directly from the ﬁrst foreign recipient required documentation of testing
of each batch of shipments.21 To increase the pool of available drugs, MEDSA prohibited manufacturers
12Id.
13See 21 C.F.R. 314.50 (1999).
14See 21 U.S.C. § 352 (2004).
15See, e.g., FDCA, 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 381 (2004).
1621 U.S.C. § 381(d) (2004).
17See Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549A–35 § 745 (2000).
18See id. (adding FDCA § 804(d)(1)–(5)).
19See id. (adding FDCA § 804(f)–(g)).
20See id. (adding FDCA § 804(d)(6)).
21See id. (adding FDCA § 804(d)(7)).
6from entering a contract or agreement that prevented sale or distribution of reimported drugs, as well.22
However, reimportation became eﬀective “‘only if the Secretary demonstrates to the Congress that the
implementation of this section will—(1) pose no additional risk to the public’s health and safety; and (2)
result in a signiﬁcant reduction in the cost of covered products to the American consumer.”’23 Secretaries
Donna Shalala and Tommy Thompson both refused certiﬁcation when presented the opportunity.24
More recently, Congress placed a provision in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Moderniza-
tion Act of 2003 (“MMA”) that instructed the HHS Secretary to issue regulations to allow pharmacies and
wholesalers to reimport certain approved drugs from Canada.25 HHS must make sure that the reimported
drugs are safe and eﬀective, and importers must comply with certain informational and records-keeping
requirements.26 Additionally, the reimported drug must pass laboratory tests to authenticate it; MMA re-
quires the drug manufacturer to provide the information needed for authentication and proper labeling to
the pharmacist or wholesaler.27 The manufacturer even must provide written authorization for the use of
approved labeling at no cost.28 Moreover, MMA grants waiver authority for personal importation, declaring
that the HHS Secretary should focus on enforcement when the threat to health is signiﬁcant, not when im-
portation is for personal use and when the drug at issue does not seem unreasonably risky.29 In particular,
HHS must grant a waiver for importation if a drug comes from a licensed pharmacy for personal use with
a less-than-90-day supply, is accompanied by a valid prescription, and is an approved import from a seller
22See id. (adding FDCA § 804(h)).
23Id. (adding FDCA § 804(l)).
24Marc Kaufman, Shalala Halts Bid to Lower Drug Costs; Reimportation Bill’s ‘Fatal Flaws’ Cited, Washington Post,
Dec. 27, 2000, at A1; Letter from Tommy Thompson, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, to the Honorable
James Jeﬀords, United States Senate (July 9, 2001), at http://www.fda.gov/oc/po/thompson/medsact.html.
25See MMA, Pub. L. No., 108-173 § 1121(a) (2003). MMA prohibits importation of certain kinds of drugs: controlled
substances, biologicals, infused or intravenously injected drugs, drugs inhaled during surgery, or parenteral drugs. See id.
(amending 21 U.S.C. § 384).
26See id. (amending FDCA § 804(d)(1)). Foreign sellers must register with the government.
27See id. (amending FDCA § 804(e)).
28See id. (amending FDCA § 804(h). The IP implications of this provision are discussed later.
29See id. (amending FDCA § 804(j)).
7registered with HHS.30 Again, this machinery can function only if HHS certiﬁes to Congress that reimporta-
tion will “pose no additional risk to the public’s health and safety” and “result in a signiﬁcant reduction in
the cost of covered products to the American consumer.”31 FDCA therefore requires any reimported drug
to be FDA-approved, to meet manufacturing and labeling requirements, and to comply with §§ 801 and 804.
MMA required HHS to conduct a study on drug importation, and the HHS Task Force on Drug Importation
(“Task Force”) released its ﬁnal report in December 2004. As discussed in greater detail below, Task Force
concluded that the current system has protected safety well and that current importation practices are
unsafe.32 Furthermore, it said that guaranteeing safety of commercialized—but not personal—importation
is possible but would be diﬃcult and costly, resulting in overall national savings that likely will be a “small
percentage of total drug spending.”33 The Task Force also warned that importation would result in four and
eighteen fewer new drugs per decade.34
B. Current Practice by Patients and FDA
The Task Force concluded that ﬁve million shipments of about 12 million prescription drugs entered from
Canada in 2003, with a total value of about $700 million.35 Most of the estimates are based on short-period,
30See id. (amending FDCA § 804(j)).
31Id. (amending FDCA § 804(l)(1)).
32See Task Force, Report on Prescription Drug Importation xii, Dec. 2004, at
http://www.hhs.gov/importtaskforce/Report1220.pdf [hereinafter “Task Force Report”].
33Id. at xiii.
34See id.
35See id. at 7. The report noted that the amount of imports from Canada has leveled oﬀ, which may signify maximum export
capacity or a change in patient behavior and that most imported drugs are ones typically used by older patients. See id. at 13.
8high-intensity blitz examinations, which found high percentages of violative drugs—however, the Task Force
declined to specify what the percentage breakdown of various problems are; some of the violations may be
highly technical, such as potential for drug interactions, while others may be drugs withdrawn from the U.S.
market for safety reasons.36
The Task Force determined from the FDA blitzes that among mail parcels, those from Canada are most fre-
quent but that other countries sometimes are included (such as Belize, Nicaragua, Romania, and Uganda)—
again, it declines to mention speciﬁc numbers, which would be quite helpful.37 Approximately sixty percent
of those interviewed coming back across the Mexican border said they had prescriptions.38 Furthermore,
several hundred Internet sites sell prescription drugs, half of which are in the U.S.39
Currently, resources limit the government’s ability to inspect the large number of prescription drugs being
imported.40 FDA has utilized its enforcement discretion to allow individual citizens coming back into the
country to bring some drugs with them if the condition is serious, the product does not present an un-
reasonable risk, the individual is under care by a U.S.-licensed doctor or is continuing treatment begun in
a foreign country, the drug is for personal use, and the quantity is a three-month supply at most.41 At
mail centers, Customs seizes controlled substances, and FDA seizes drugs according to prior counterfeiting
history; injectability; the label; the history of the importer, exporter, and recipient; and the presence of a
36See id. at 13–14.
37See id. at 15.
38See id. at 16.
39See id. A newer development is the storefront pharmacy, which is a walk-in U.S. business that works with a Canadian
pharmacy to provide drugs to patients. See id.
40See id. at viii.
41See id. at viii, 6 (citing FDA, Regulatory Procedures Manual, Subchapter, Import Operations/Actions: Coverage of
Personal Importations, Mar. 2004).
9special alert.42
Diﬀerent governments have encouraged personal importation as well. Springﬁeld, Mass., gave city employees
a Canadian option, as did Boston.43 By the end of 2003, “about a dozen states had announced their
intentions to look into the possibility of importing drugs.”44 Even United Health has allowed AARP plan
members to receive reimbursement for imported drugs.45 Drug companies have retaliated by conditioning
sales to Canada on a promise not to allow export to the U.S. or placing other limits to monitor and track
supplies.46 They have justiﬁed their opposition based primarily on concerns for safety and the integrity of
the regulatory process and concerns about resources for R&D.47
Part II. Drug Pricing and Purchasing in the U.S.
Pharmaceutical pricing remains a somewhat mysterious process, but high prices for brand name on-patent
drugs clearly have become a major concern for many Americans.48 Furthermore, the drug industry has
taken a public relations beating as high prices have infuriated large portions of the public. Moreover, drug
42See id. at 12.
43See Marcia Angell, The Truth About Drug Companies 222 (2004). Other cities include Burlington, Vt.; Montgomery,
Ala.; Portland, Maine; Revere, Mass.; and Worcester, Mass. See Jane Bryant Quinn, A Remedy For Pricey Drugs, Newsweek,
Sept. 27, 2004, at 31.
44Angell, supra note 43, at 223.
45See id.
46See id. at 224. GlaxoSmithKline required Canadian pharmacies to promise not to sell its drugs in the U.S.; Pﬁzer required
pharmacies to order its drugs from the company, not wholesalers, to allow Pﬁzer to track orders; Lilly warned wholesalers
that supplying to Canadian pharmacies that supply the U.S. was a violation of contract; and AstraZeneca promised to limit
shipments to Canadian pharmacies with unusually large orders.
47See id. at 224.
48See Harris, supra note 9 (citing a poll showing that ﬁfty-seven percent called drugs “unreasonably high”); Harris Interactive,
Higher Out-of-Pocket Costs Cause Massive Non-Compliance in the Use of Prescription Drugs, and This is Likely to Grow,
Dec. 9, 2004, at http://harrisinteractive.com/news/allnewsbydate.asp?NewsID=552.
10prices are tempting for policymakers to criticize because R&D costs are already sunk, while marginal costs
of manufacture are small.49 Many authors have severely criticized the drug industry for its prices, and its
business model generally.50 As a result of consolidation in the drug industry, companies depend on a few
high-margin blockbusters, which “typically [have] to be sold at a high price, for ‘chronic’ or long-term use, to
a vast number of people.”51 At the same time, the manufacturer faces potentially severe drop-oﬀs in proﬁts
when the blockbusters go oﬀ-patent, yet the company “has to produce each year to meet investors’ demand
for steep and steady earnings growth.”52 The industry remains vulnerable to product cycles, although the
pipeline for the coming year appears full.53
Drug pricing is fairly complex, and it changes in response to diﬀerent environmental stimuli. Kolassa writes
from the perspective that drug prices are not high enough, warning that politicians view complaints about
drug prices as a relatively risk-free approach that is popular with constituents. The drug industry “pleads
the need for research as its only defense for prices,” but Kolassa warns that “the public has not shown
willingness to accept that as an argument.”54 He says that complaints about high prices are really the
result of “poor communication of value” by drug companies.55 The general pricing structure is based on
Average Wholesale Price (“AWP”), with the exact retail price based on factors such as commercial success
and duration of use.56 Institutions negotiate even lower prices.57
Kolassa claims that pharmaceutical markets are generally unresponsive to price changes.58 He also notes
49See Ernst R. Berndt, Pharmaceuticals in U.S. Health Care, 16 J. of Econ. Perspectives 45 (2002).
50One particularly vehement critic describes it as “voracious and unsustainable.” Katharine Greider, The Big Fix xiv
(2003).
51Id. at xv.
52Id.
53See Conrad De Aenlle, One Eye on Drug Stocks, the Other on Election Day, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 2004, at 7.
54E.M. Kolassa, Elements of Pharmaceutical Pricing 21 (1997).
55Id. at 23.
56See id. at 38-39.
57See id. at 40.
58See id. at 64. Many economists focus on demand factors in explaining the drug marketplace. See Berndt, supra note 49,
at 57 (discussing the heterogeneity of demand).
11that many pricing models fail to account for the fact that physicians generally do not know the price to the
patient of the drugs they prescribe, which is part of the general opacity of pricing.59 In setting their prices,
drug companies will consider the prices and features of the competition, patient characteristics, economic
and social value of the therapy, decision-making criteria of prescribers, disease characteristics, company
needs, company abilities, the insurance reimbursement environment, and the public policy environment.60
Other research has indicated that drugs oﬀering “important therapeutic gains” were priced higher than those
oﬀering “modest therapeutic gains.”61
The awareness of the price of drugs has increased recently because of changes in health care ﬁnancing.
The millions of uninsured Americans have always faced high prices, but even companies that provide their
employees with health insurance are often cutting back on drug beneﬁts. Furthermore, patients in managed
care companies experience a three-tiered system of co-payments for generics, preferred brand name, and
non-preferred brand name drugs.62 Harris Interactive found that twenty-two percent of adults did not ﬁll a
prescription, ﬁfteen percent used a lower dose to make a prescription last longer, and eighteen percent took
a drug less often than prescribed because of cost in the past year.63 Among patients with out-of-pocket
costs of $500 or more a year, forty-four percent did not ﬁll a prescription, forty-two percent did not ask
for a prescription, forty-one percent used a lower dose, and forty-six percent used a drug less often than
prescribed.64 Among patients with fair or poor health, one-third did not ask for a prescription, forty-one
59See Kolassa, supra note 54, at 74. Although Kolassa views this as a factor to take advantage of, this paper will discuss the
merits of price transparency.
60See id. at 46.
61F.M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry—Prices and Progress, 351 NEJM 927, 928 (2004). Drugs with modest im-
provement were priced at over two times the price of substitutes, while those with important gain were priced over three times
the level, but these results come from a study predating many changes in drug pricing and have not been replicated. See id.
62See Greider, supra note 50, at 3. Moreover, some companies even have consumers pay a percentage of the drug’s actual
price based on this three-tiered system. See id.
63See Harris, supra note 9.
64See id.
12percent did not ﬁll a prescription, twenty-nine percent used a lower dose, and thirty-seven percent used a
drug less often than prescribed because of cost.65 Pharmaceutical expenditures continue to grow for multiple
reasons—perhaps the biggest driver is quantity growth, although price increases also matter.66 However, it
is unclear how much of this quantity growth is marketing-driven and how much reﬂects greater access and
appropriate use.67
Greider points out that under the current system, those with the least means—the uninsured—paradoxically
pay the most for their drugs.68 Also, “because discounts are negotiated from the list price, there’s a perverse
incentive to keep that price . . . in nosebleed territory.”69 Pharmacy beneﬁt managers (“PBMs”), the
purchasing middlemen, do not share the negotiated price they pay manufacturers, obscuring the marketplace
even further.70 PBMs have undergone increasing scrutiny recently as more information about their business
practices has leaked out. Multiple lawsuits have charged the PBM formerly known as Merck-Medco (now
Medco) for an improper relationship with Merck, which allegedly “directed Medco to ensure that all Merck’s
patented products were included in lists of drugs available to patients” and “at rates that exceeded Merck’s
general share of the market nationwide.”71 Medco also paid a $42.5 million settlement in New York class-
action lawsuits alleging failure to disclose the extent of its rebate from drug manufacturers.72 The U.S.
Attorney’s Oﬃce in Philadelphia joined a suit alleging that Medco gained $430 million in rebates from Merck
65See id.
66See Berndt, supra note 49, at 49.
67See id. at 49, 52.
68See Greider, supra note 50, at 9. In fact, economists have concluded that “price diﬀerentials are not related to recouping
losses by shifting costs. Rather, they represent unequal bargaining power across diﬀerent classes of purchasers.” Richard G.
Frank, Prescription Drug Prices, 20 Health Affairs 115, 121 (2001).
69Greider, supra note 50, at 9.
70See id. at 13.
71Peter Shinkle, Peabody Energy Accuses Drugmaker Merck of Racketeering, Embezzlement, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan.
16, 2004, at C1.
72See id.
13in 2001 alone, and it also alleged that Medco’s mail-order facility billed patients in the federal employees
health plan for drugs they did not receive and switched prescriptions without consent.73 The whistleblowers
in the mail-order suit alleged that Medco employees did not ﬁll prescriptions, shortchanged patients on
the amount of drugs ordered, and switched patients to more expensive medications.74 Documents in the
class-action suit indicated that drug makers paid over $3 billion in rebates to Merck-Medco in the late
1990s.75
Investigations have implicated other large PBMs for failing to perform their bulk-buying middleman function
appropriately. In New York, Eliot Spitzer sued Express Scripts for improperly pocketing up to $100 million
in rebates, while the company claimed it saved the state $2 billion.76 Spitzer alleged that Express Scripts
inﬂated the cost of drugs, failed to pass along rebates, persuaded doctors to switch prescriptions to drugs
more proﬁtable to the PBM, and inﬂated the cost of generics.77 The Illinois Attorney General is also
investigating PBMs, and Caremark acknowledges that it does “accept payments from drugmakers to promote
their products but say[s] it is in the interest of education.”78 As a result, some large businesses, such as a
54-business coalition including IBM, have begun forming coalitions to negotiate for drug bargains directly
without using PBMs.79
73See id.
74Alice Dembner, Drug Firm Accused of Cheating State Said to Scam Millions; Medco Denies Charges, Boston Globe,
Nov. 17, 2003, at B1; see also Complaint, U.S. ex rel. Hunt & Gauger v. Medco, No. 99-CV-2322 (E.D.Pa. ﬁled Mar. 18,
2003); Complaint, U.S. ex rel. Piacentile v. Medco, No. 00-CV-737 (E.D.Pa. ﬁled Feb. 10, 2000), at http://www.usdoj.gov/
usao/pae/News/Pr/2003/jun/jun03.html.
75See Milt Freudenheim, Documents Detail Big Payments By Drug Makers to Sway Sales, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 2003, at
C1.
76See Rick Brand, $153G Prescription Plan Audit, Newsday, Dec. 22, 2004, at A18.
77See Ellen Kelleher, Spitzer Sues Express Scripts for Overcharging, Financial Times, Aug. 5, 2004, at
20; see also Complaint, N.Y. v. Express Scripts, Inc. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. ﬁled Aug. 4, 2004), at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/aug/aug4a 04 attach.pdf.
78Bruce Japsen, Drug-beneﬁt Managers’ Loyalties Questioned, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 22, 2004, at C1.
79See, David Nicklaus, Express Scripts Flap May Boil Down to a Contract Dispute, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 25,
2004, at D1.
14Therefore, many patients experience a pharmaceutical market where drugs are priced beyond their reach
and receive sub-optimal therapy because they are not taking medications properly, if at all. Americans
have become acutely aware of the cost of drugs, but at the same time, actual drug prices are very obscure
both to patients and their physicians.80 As on an airplane, one knows how much he or she paid but has
no clue what the person across the aisle paid. Furthermore, private market-oriented solutions, such as
PBMs, have not achieved universal acceptance for eﬃciency, honesty, and proper care, if the allegations on
fraud and prescription-switching describe common practice.81 Ignoring workability for the moment, personal
reimportation clearly allows patients to choose where to buy drugs based on transparent pricing, and cost
savings clearly go through to the purchaser.
Part III. How Diﬀerent Are U.S. and Foreign Drug Prices
Despite the angst over American drug prices, a reimportation scheme does not work unless drug prices are
lower abroad. A series of studies and articles have documented a diﬀerence in retail price between brand-
name drugs in the U.S. and Canada. One article compared out-of-pocket prices and found a diﬀerence of
thirty-three to eighty percent.82 Similarly, a report prepared for Vermont representative Bernard Sanders
found a cost diﬀerential of eighty-one percent for the ten patented nongeneric drugs with the highest sales
to elder Americans in 1997.83
80See Frank, supra note 68, at 116.
81Diﬀerent employers and managed care organizations negotiate for diﬀerent prices. On top of this, the federal government
pays diﬀerent prices depending on the program. As discussed below, the new Medicare prescription drug beneﬁt does not have
an explicit pricing requirement. However, Medicaid has a “best price” requirement, and the VA and some other government
entities pay the lowest prices in the country according to the Federal Supply Schedule. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8 (2005); Veterans
Health Care Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-585 § 603, 106 Stat. 4971 (1992).
82Mark Sherman, AP Survey: Drug Prices Cheaper in Canada, AP, Nov. 7, 2003.
83Minority Staﬀ of House Comm. on Gov’t Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong., Prescription Drug Pricing in Vermont: An
15After these and other well-publicized comparisons of the price diﬀerential between identical drugs in the U.S.
and Canada, several economists attacked these studies for utilizing improper methodology that overestimates
the true diﬀerential. One of the leading authors on price diﬀerentials, Patricia Danzon, says that application
of widely accepted principles for price comparisons yield a signiﬁcantly smaller price diﬀerence between the
two markets. In her analyses, Danzon insists on including generic drugs in the price diﬀerential, comparing
prices at the same stage in the manufacturing and distribution chain, and measuring price by molecular
weight.84 Utilizing this methodology, she found that other countries have prices between six and thirty-
three percent lower than the U.S., with Canada’s prices being the lowest.85 However correct Danzon’s
conclusions may be in an academic sense, they do not apply precisely to the reimportation context. No one
reimports generic drugs, which frequently are subsidized by foreign governments (explaining the lower U.S.
price)—instead, reimportation precisely targets the drugs where the price diﬀerence is the greatest.
The price diﬀerential has two very diﬀerent dimensions. The ﬁrst one is the real-life one, the price that
patients pay—this is the driving force behind their purchasing decisions. Therefore, the fact that a drug
costs signiﬁcantly less when purchased in Canada matters much more than a purely economic analysis of cost
per molecule can indicate. The only reason that reimportation has become so politically popular is the fact
that brand name drug prices in the U.S. are high compared to prices in other countries. However, the second
dimension matters as well when examining reimportation in a context outside of personal reimportation.86
International Price Comparison, Nov. 1, 1998, at http://bernie.house.gov/prescriptions/international.asp.
84See, e.g., Patricia Danzon & Michael F. Furukawa, Prices and Availability of Pharmaceuticals, Health Affairs, Oct. 29,
2003, at http://content.healthaﬀairs.org/cgi/
content/full/hlthaﬀ.w4.405/DC1.
85See id. (attributing much of this price diﬀerence to exchange rates).
86Personal reimportation is essentially direct importation by an American patient, who contacts and deals with a foreign
16When it comes to calculating the economic feasibility of a commercial reimportation mechanism, the fact
that the price diﬀerential is less drastic than the one consumers experience determines whether there is
enough cushion to justify reimportation after the middlemen take their cut. Unfortunately, as critical as
this element is for the policy analysis, the available numbers remain speculative. This presents an important
obstacle to those both for and against reimportation, but the paper will consider this after addressing two
more clearly deﬁned objections to reimportation: (1) safety and the integrity of the U.S. regulatory process
and (2) the impact on R&D.
Part IV. Argument Against Reimportation #1: Reimportation is
Unsafe
One obviously pressing concern is whether drug reimportation is unsafe or undermines the integrity of the
drug regulatory process. Critics from the drug industry to government oﬃcials have argued that reim-
portation poses unacceptable risks to patients because FDA has not certiﬁed it. However, advocates of
reimportation of drugs counter that imported drugs have not resulted in major health problems to date
and that a more formalized mechanism of ensuring safety could provide an extremely high level of quality
assurance. The Task Force concluded that the real question is one of cost, not safety.87
pharmacy on an individual basis. Commercial reimportation refers to a formalized structure where intermediaries take part in
the bulk movement of drugs, which are then dispensed for individuals in the U.S.
87See below for a discussion on the impact of cost on feasibility. This section focuses on the safety issue.
17A. Pro-Reimportation Perspectives
Greider argues that “you can’t guarantee against adulterated drugs crossing the border, but neither can you
guarantee drugs won’t be tampered with inside the United States, nor can anyone give 100-percent assurance
against contamination of other products we import—food, for example.”88 Implicitly, she is accepting the
risk that comes with reimportation, but she is doing so too ﬂippantly. Just because imported food might be
unsafe does not justify importation of unsafe drugs. Instead, addressing the safety requirement requires fair
analysis of the risks and beneﬁts of reimportation.89
Some groups already have experience in striving for safe reimportation. At the same hearings that Hubbard
testiﬁed in, a CEO whose physician health organization set up a program to help the elderly get drugs
from Canada testiﬁed to the safety and satisfaction of participants. The program limited eligible drugs
to maintenance (chronic disease) drugs and required the involvement of the patient’s personal physician; a
Canadian physician reviewed the medical information and consulted with the American physician.90 In her
written statement, Wennar asserted that the literature “does not support fears about counterfeit drugs being
dispensed (at least in Canada),” that her customers were satisﬁed, and that physician engagement increased
compliance, lowering overall costs to the health care system.91 She also suggested that to maintain safety,
“all participating pharmacies would be registered with the FDA. In order to do so, they would have to be
accredited....”92 These accredited pharmacies would receive “unique bar codes” for shipments to the U.S. 93
Furthermore, she argued that the U.S. could create a proxy with the exporting country to monitor quality
88Greider, supra note 50, at 20.
89As discussed below, Greider acknowledges that the drug industry might simply dry up the supply. See id. at 21. This may
not be a possible approach for PhRMA in Europe, where the European Commission approves parallel imports. See id.
90Reimportation Hearings, supra note 10, at 66 (statement by Elizabeth Wennar, President and CEO, United Health Alliance).
91Id. at 67. Wennar stated in her oral testimony that the imported drugs “are coming out of the same bottles that are being
prescribed for Canadian citizens. Id. at 85.
92Id. at 67.
93Id.
18of reimported drugs and that there “is no reason that we can not accept the standards that are equal or
higher established by another country. No country should be allowed to participate that does not have at
the very least a set of standards equal to ours.”94 In fact, she said, Canadian pharmacies “are more than
willing to be held accountable. They are willing to let you do site visits. They are willing to be held to the
highest standard.”95
Avorn points out that the drug industry “beneﬁts from many aspects of globalization, including the right
to buy its supplies wherever on earth it can get the best deal.”96 In fact, even clinical research has joined
the ﬂow of services subject to outsourcing, as companies have run clinical trials in India, Brazil, China,
and Mexico.97 On the other hand, Avorn describes PhRMA’s safety campaign against reimportation as
“xenophobic doubts.”98 The industry threatened to cut oﬀ exports to Canada, and Avorn christened the
campaign the “Maple Peril.”99 Secretary Thompson adopted this agenda, arguing that reimportation could
increase the ﬂow of counterfeit and contaminated drugs; he also claimed that the risk was somehow greater
in light of the anthrax attacks.100 Avorn concludes:
94Id. at 68. A discussion of the larger implications of her statements on importation of non-U.S. versions appears later in
the paper.
95Id. at 85.
96Jerry Avorn, Powerful Medicines 223 (2004).
97See Saritha Rai, Drug Companies Cut Costs With Foreign Clinical Trials, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 2005, at C1.
98Avorn, supra note 96, at 223.
99Id. In response, some states “are increasingly turning to Europe for deals now that the Canadian government is
considering shutting oﬀ the southbound ﬂow.” AP, States Look to Europe for Prescription Drugs, Jan. 14, 2005, at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/HEALTH/01/
14/drug/importation.ap/index.html (last viewed Mar. 3, 2005).
100See id. at 224.
19One might have expected FDA to intervene on behalf of the public and establish a means
of certifying which imported drugs pass U.S. standards, exactly as it presently does for
products manufactured abroad by large multinational pharmaceutical companies. Instead,
it responded to the Maple Peril by aligning itself ﬁrmly on the side of the drug industry. . . . In
the face of all the legitimate concerns of doctors and patients about real drug side eﬀects,
FDA’s most visible public pronouncements about risk in recent years dealt instead with the
supposed hazards of drugs from Canada—despite the near-total absence of any scientiﬁc
evidence substantiating this risk.101
His admonition raises the point that the government has focused much more on the perils of reimportation
rather than on scrutinizing whether it is workable. The Task Force Report does begin to move in the latter
direction, but its hesitancy towards importation was almost a foregone conclusion based on the previous
opposition of members such as McClellan.102 At the same time, Avorn’s criticism does not recognize the
FDA’s interest in maintaining its regulatory process as well as a legitimate concern of the lack of a reporting
apparatus to detect harms from personal importation.
Angell also acknowledges the safety concerns but believes they are overstated. She points out that “large
drug companies have many plants scattered throughout the world,” including Pﬁzer, which had sixty plants
in thirty-two countries in 2003.103 Like Avorn, Angell says that “many of the key ingredients in American
brand-name drugs come from foreign suppliers” and that about half of major drug companies are Europe-
based.104 The existing, legal production and distribution chain has many points where counterfeiting is
possible, but “there is absolutely no reason to think counterfeiting is more likely with drugs imported from
Canada than with drugs that are sold at home, and some reason to think it is less likely.”105 FDA standards
102See Mark McClellan, Speech Before First International Colloquium on Generic Medicine, Sept. 25, 2003, at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/speeches/2003/genericdrug0925.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2005).
103Angell, supra note 43, at 221.
104Id. Around sixty percent of the key ingredients in American brand-name drugs and seventy to eighty percent in American
generic drugs come from foreign suppliers. See Donald G. McNeil, Selling Cheap ‘Generic’ Drugs, India’s Copycats Irk Industry,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 2000, at A1.
105Angell, supra note 43, at 222.
20apply regardless of where drug companies are, so manufacturing standards of FDA-approved reimported
drugs remain identical.106 It is true that Pﬁzer makes most of its Lipitor in Ireland, and GlaxoSmithKline
makes much of its Avandia in Puerto Rico.107 Pﬁzer’s corporate website claims 20,000 employees “at major
manufacturing sites located in the U.S., Canada, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, Africa, and Asia.”108
However, internationalization does not prove Angell’s belief that reimportation is safe—at most, it highlights
the fact that FDA has largely decided to trust the drug industry in its extra-U.S. business activities. If those
companies can maintain secure channels for moving drugs from foreign countries to the U.S., presumably a
similar mechanism could make reimportation safe also.
B. Prohibitions on Reimportation: FDA Policy
As mentioned in the previous discussion on the legal status of reimportation, Congress has tried to appease
both sides by permitting reimportation upon HHS certiﬁcation, which has not occurred. The House did
vote to legalize reimportation without certiﬁcation 243-186 in July 2003, but the Senate killed the bill; the
certiﬁcation provision remained unchanged in the Medicare Modernization Act.109
An FDA oﬃcial testifying on the safety of imported drugs told the Congressional committee that “[c]onsumers
106See id. at 222.
107See Dawn MacKeen, Prescription Trips, Newsday, Sept. 19, 2004, at A3.
108Pﬁzer Global Manufacturing, More About PGM, at http://www.pﬁzer.com/
subsites/pgm/more/index.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
109See id. at 226; the rejected House bill was the Pharmaceutical Market Access Act, H.R. 2427, 108th Cong. § 4(10) (2003)
(repealing the certiﬁcation requirement).
21cannot discern the diﬀerence between a counterfeit drug or a good drug.... No one in FDA can tell the
diﬀerence. Even people in the company cannot tell the diﬀerence without doing testing.”110 Hubbard said
that FDA had opened ﬁfty-ﬁve counterfeit cases between 1998 and 2002, resulting in 26 convictions, “but
we are worried that this problem is growing fairly fast.”111 Unfortunately, these data do not clarify the
breakdown between domestic and foreign counterfeiting.
As discussed above, FDA does have a personal importation policy, which allows individuals to import drugs
in certain circumstances. FDA allows enforcement discretion to allow
entry of an unapproved prescription drug only if the intended use is for a serious condition
for which eﬀective treatment may not be available domestically; the product is considered
not to represent an unreasonable risk; the product is for personal use; there is no known
commercialization or promotion to U.S. residents by those involved in the distribution of
the product; and the individual seeking to import the product aﬃrms in writing that it is
for the patient’s own use and provides the name and address of the U.S. licensed doctor
responsible for his or her treatment. . . .112
However, allowing even small-scale importation is intellectually inconsistent with FDA’s “gold standard” for
safety, which maintains that only the current system of PhRMA possession and FDA’s theoretical ability
to inspect is guaranteed safe. A witness testifying on behalf of PhRMA noted that FDA now claims “that
the personal importation policy has outgrown its usefulness and now presents a threat to public health.”113
However, it is not clear what has changed since the 1980s to make the personal importation policy so
threatening. Furthermore, drug companies can reimport their own products, and FDA exercises very little
scrutiny over them. When pressed, Hubbard stated that in current legal reimportation “the company is the
110Reimportation Hearings, supra note 10, at 20 (statement of William K. Hubbard, Senior Associate Commissioner, Oﬃce
of Policy, Planning and Legislation, FDA).
111Id.
113Id. at 78 (statement of Peter Barton Hutt, attorney, PhRMA).
22one that is maintaining the custody, not—FDA doesn’t hold the drug.”114
These inconsistencies do not prove that reimportation is safe, however. The attorney for PhRMA pointed
out the unanimous opposition of federal agencies, such as Customs, DEA, and CMS, to reimportation.115
Hubbard warned in his written testimony that FDA cannot guarantee the safety of drugs purchased from
Internet sites “not operated by pharmacies licensed and operating within state pharmacy law or sites that
dispense foreign drugs.”116 Yet again, there is a problematic lack of speciﬁcity about the potential for
real harm—Hubbard lists some examples, but none of the drugs he listed in his written testimony had any
connection to foreign counterfeiting, reinforcing the fact that the problem may not be a foreign one as much
as a domestic one and that one of the driving forces for counterfeiting is the high out-of-pocket price of drugs
in the U.S.117
C. The Task Force’s Conclusions on Safety
Ultimately, the Task Force decided that safe commercial reimportation was possible with an appropriate
regulatory scheme but that current personal importation was unsafe.118 Unfortunately, the Task Force
largely is drawing conclusions based on a lack of data, which it generally acknowledged.119 Potentially
114Id. at 54 (statement of Hubbard).
115See id. at 78 (statement of Hutt).
116Id. at 25.
117See id. at 30-31. FDA still warns that allowing individuals to import directly from Canadian pharmacies “would greatly
exacerbate the growing problem of hundreds of websites purporting to sell legitimate medications that are in fact selling
unapproved or otherwise dangerous drugs to Americans.” Id. Canada, Hubbard speculates, will become a center for “dangerous
products from all points around the globe.” Id. He also testiﬁed that drug reimportation has had “probably an exponential
increase in the last 4 or 5 years” while admitting “we don’t have any ﬁrm data.” Id. at 33.
118Task Force Report, supra note 32, at 7. Despite the feasibility of commercial importation, the Task Force distinguishes
personal importation, which “creates numerous vulnerabilities in the drug distribution system, making it extraordinarily diﬃcult
to ensure that imported drugs are safe and eﬀective, and putting patients at risk.” Id. at 44.
119See id. at 9.
23adding to the confusion is the fact that the comments on whether reimportation is safe represented almost
the entire spectrum of opinion.120
One problem is that no one knows how many consumers are not buying their medicines—Congressman
Sherrod Brown complained at a House committee meeting, “FDA has not conducted a study of the actual
dangers to prove to seniors that the risks of taking imported drugs are greater than the risks of not taking
anything at all.”121 Another committee member wanted to know “precisely whether [FDA] has quantiﬁed
the risk posed by personal reimportation,” but the answer remains no.122 Despite the concern about creating
a two-tier system of drugs, if a signiﬁcant portion of the population cannot buy any drugs at all, Congress’s
policy calculation might shift. At the same time, maintaining the integrity of the American drug regulatory
process remains an independent goal for most interested parties.
The Task Force worried that Canadian pharmacies that cannot meet U.S. demand may look to ﬁll pre-
scriptions from other countries, that Canada regulates drugs for export less strictly, and that Canadian
pharmacy internet sites may not actually be Canadian and receive Canadian oversight.123 It also asserted
that if Congress opened up the system beyond reimportation to importation of versions not approved in
the U.S., foreign drugs may not be exactly interchangeable, “even if the facility is FDA-registered and in-
spected.”124 The Task Force acknowledged that the Veriﬁed Internet Pharmacy Practice Site certiﬁcation
120Some thought that safety would be best-assured by limiting reimportation to a list of best-selling drugs, some favored
beginning with Canada and then expanding reimportation to other countries, and most opposed creation of a two-tier system.
See id. at 9–10. Comments also disagreed on the ability to test product authenticity at the border. See id. at 10. Most of the
comments claimed safety was paramount for imported drugs. See id. at 16.
121Reimportation Hearings, supra note 10, at 4 (statement of Ohio Sherrod Brown, Member, House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce).
122Id. at 5 (statement of La. Billy Tauzin, Member, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce). Tauzin is now the president
of PhRMA.
123See Task Force Report, supra note 32, at 17.
124Id. at 18. At the same time, some countries are clearly unsafe sources of drugs, and some drugs are not suitable for
24was valuable, although it still had concerns about proper monitoring of internet pharmacies.125 The Task
Force concludes by claiming that testing cannot prove safety and that quality comes only from assurance
of the entire process.126 Border testing can verify presence of the active ingredient but “would be inade-
quate to identify the purity and potency of the product or to determine whether it was made according to
cGMPs [current Good Manufacturing Practices], is expired, has been stored under adverse or inappropriate
conditions, or is counterfeit.”127
D. Objections to Reimportation and Possible Workarounds
The Task Force’s concerns do not state a deﬁnitive case against the safety of reimportation. However, they
do present challenges that any legalized reimportation regime would have to meet. This requires employment
of multiple safeguards, from certiﬁcation requirements to border testing to anticounterfeiting measures.128
1. Multistep Measures are Necessary to Ensure Safety
FDA and PhRMA do not give credence to many of the safety mechanisms proposed in various reimportation
bills. For instance, in 2002, they opposed a commercial importation plan that allowed pharmacists and
wholesalers to purchase drugs from Canadian sellers. The bill required compliance with FDCA §§ 501, 502,
reimportation. See id. at 2, 21. These include injectables, biologics, surgical drugs, controlled substances, and those highly
susceptible to counterfeiting.
125See id. at 18–19. Rogue pharmacies may sell bad drugs, not tell the truth about their location, not comply with practice
standards, and not require a prescription. See id. at 19–20.
126See id.
127Id. at 21.
128Minnesota oﬀered to employ a pharmacy certiﬁcation process for its reimportation plan but still did not gain FDA approval.
See Letter from William K. Hubbard, Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning, FDA, to the Honorable Tim Pawlenty,
Governor, Minnesota (Feb. 23, 2004) at http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/
hottopics/importdrugs/pawlenty022304.html.
25and 505, which FDA warned “may be found, in practice” to require that American manufacturers “would have
to sell drug products manufactured, labeled and intended solely for the U.S. market to Canadian distributors,
speciﬁcally for re-sale to the U.S.”129 Furthermore, “it is not clear as to how FDA could ensure that drugs
reimported under this proposal would in fact comply with those sections of the Act, because the Agency has
no practical ability to regulate or inspect Canadian facilities.”130 FDA also said that ensuring safety under
FDCA § 804(b) by requiring testing was inadequate because “authenticity can rarely be established solely
through chemical analysis.”131 Instead, FDA believed authenticity “can only be assured by the multiple
layers of safeguards that are built into the FDA’s oversight system in which drug approval, regulation,
inspections and surveillance tracks drugs over their entire life cycle.”132 Testing could not protect against
counterfeit drugs because the “threat of counterfeits does not depend on the integrity of the product itself,
but on the integrity of those handling it.”133 FDA perhaps aims for this level of safety, but it currently lacks
the resources to practice this kind of all-encompassing inquiry—the idea that counterfeits can be mixed “by
the bottle, or by the pill” may be true, but if that is the standard, then FDA’s current “gold standard” has
the same vulnerability.134
Similarly, the attorney for PhRMA criticized the provisions intended to make commercial reimportation
safe. He described end product testing as inadequate “to demonstrate that a drug was manufactured in
accordance with U.S. approval standards and quality requirements. Testing at the moment of import also
does not ensure the integrity of the drug throughout its shelf life.”135 The chain of custody provision also
129Reimportation Hearings, supra note 10, at 32 (statement by Hubbard).
130Id.
131Id.
132Id.
133Id.
134Id.
135Id. at 73.
26may be inaccurate because documents could be forged.136 PhRMA claimed that each element of FDA
regulation, which is intentionally redundant, is required to assure safety. This includes personnel, quality
control programs, facilities, speciﬁcations, written procedures, eﬀective process monitoring, lot control, and
packaging and stability testing.137 PhRMA also argued that limiting importation to certain countries did not
guarantee safety because of the possibility of transshipment, and it worried about variations between domestic
and foreign versions of drugs.138 Additionally, PhRMA aﬃrmed the independent value of maintaining an
unbroken drug distribution chain.139 As a result, it questioned FDA’s ability to enforce a recall during
reimportation, raised concerns about oversight of repackaging, and warned that storage conditions were
often outside FDA’s scrutiny.140
In reality, FDA does not regularly inspect each of these aspects of the manufacturing process—“FDA inspec-
tions of manufacturing plants every few years conﬁrm these activities are up to their high standards.”141
Another useful area for comparison comes from food importation, where FDA exercises inspection over non-
meat products.142 In this case, Hubbard said, FDA does “random sampling” to enforce its standards, such
as those on pesticide use.143 Certainly, food and drugs are somewhat distinguishable, but in both cases,
consumers will be unable to recognize safe and unsafe products. Nevertheless, the legal authority to inspect
facilities and products still has value as part of FDA’s regulatory authority despite its infrequent use.
136See id.
137See id. at 73-74. Manufacturing safety requires proper starting materials and good manufacturing practices; the identity
of the active ingredient, its physical state, the excipients, and the amount of impurities all factor into a drug’s quality. See id.
at 76.
138See id. at 74–75. In some ways, the objection to foreign versions of drugs is specious because PhRMA is arguing that some
of the products that it sells are less safe. However, the drug industry places an independent value on maintaining the FDA’s
process.
139See id. at 75.
140See id.
141Id. at 74 (emphasis added).
142See FDA, Food Safety: A Team Approach, Sept. 24, 1998, at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/∼lrd/foodteam.html (last viewed
Mar. 16, 2005).
143Reimportation Hearings, supra note 10, at 47.
27The industry witness also argued that Canada-only limitations were inadequate because Canada would
become a “gateway for counterfeit drugs” and because Canadian law “explicitly exempts pharmaceuticals
intended for export from any regulatory oversight whatsoever.”144 Wennar responded to this point by
reminding the subcommittee that a safe reimportation plan would involve Canadian pharmacies and not
merely allow transshipment.145 Alternatively, reimportation could expand to a larger list of secure countries,
diminishing the probability that any one would become a haven for counterfeit drugs.
The FDA Counterfeit Drug Task Force recently recommended several avenues for increasing drug supply
security. Adoption of the recommendations of the FDA Counterfeit Drug Task Force would presumably
take care of two problems at once. It would implement the best practice currently known for ensuring a
safe drug supply, and it would also provide the kind of distribution chain authentication that could make
commercial reimportation safe. The Counterfeit Drug Task Force made several recommendations, such as
using “unit of use packaging,” a “container closure system designed to hold a speciﬁc quantity of drug
product for a speciﬁc use and dispensed to a patient without any modiﬁcation except for the addition
of appropriate labeling.”146 FDA also endorsed tamper evident packaging as another “layer in a multi-
layered anti-counterfeiting strategy.”147 Other authentication technologies like taggants, chemical markers,
or other unique identiﬁers “have been suﬃciently perfected they can now serve as a critical component of any
strategy.”148 FDA endorsed creating a list of drugs most likely to be counterfeited, as well.149 Finally, the
Counterfeit Drug Task Force strongly endorsed radio-frequency identiﬁcation (“RFID”) technology, which
144Id. at 74.
145See id. at 98 (statement by Wennar).
146FDA, Combating Counterfeit Drugs 4, Feb. 2004, at http://www.fda.gov/
oc/initiatives/counterfeit/report02 04.pdf [hereinafter Counterfeit Report].
147Id. at 5.
148Id. at 5, 7.
149See id. at 8.
28enjoyed “universal support” from commenters.150 RFID would be part of mass serialization, the “single
most powerful tool available to secure the U.S. drug supply.”151 FDA concluded that it would be possible
to implement RFID widely by 2007.152 Additionally, the agency pledged to create a Counterfeit Alert
Network and to encourage reporting as part of a wider campaign to educate consumers and professionals.153
For anticounterfeiting to succeed, stakeholders throughout the distribution chain would have to participate,
especially repackagers.154 The comments also supported FDA’s determination to “collaborate with foreign
stakeholders to develop strategies to deter and detect counterfeit drugs globally.”155 Of course, this kind
of international cooperation would ensure safe drugs in the U.S. and also beneﬁt participating countries.
Presumably, the international partners most likely to cooperate are also the ones who would be the best
candidates for being an approved country for reimportation.
Ultimately, the Importation Task Force concluded that commercial reimportation could provide a closed
distribution system given adequate resources and authority.156 The necessary components included a reg-
istration and licensure scheme with background checks, inspections, storage and handling standards, and
recordkeeping requirements.157 Establishing a chain of custody would require a pedigree, perhaps utilizing
RFID, which is currently voluntary and not yet global.158 These electronic technologies have great promise,
but they need to become more widespread and could increase costs.159 Incorporating a device from food
150Id. at 9.
151Id.
152See id. at 11. FDA and several drug makers have subsequently pledged their support of RFID. See Gardiner Harris, Tiny
Antennas to Keep Tabs on U.S. Drugs, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 2004, at A1.
153See Counterfeit Report, supra note 146, at 21–22, 27, 29.
154See id. at 25.
155Id. at 30.
156See Task Force Report, supra note 32, at 41.
157See id.
158See id. at 42.
159See id. at 45.
29imports, the Task Force recommended a prior notice requirement to evaluate whether inspection could be
better-tailored to the product being imported.160 The packaging should state country of origin, and re-
labeling of imported drugs might require other changes in U.S. labeling law.161 Finally, the Task Force
envisions testing and authentication as part of the safety process.162 The Task Force deems the beneﬁts of
these anti-counterfeiting measures to be well worth the cost, so this is a reform that could occur outside of
the reimportation context.163 Presumably, if safety and counterfeiting were really such a pressing concern
for politicians and drug manufacturers, they would be moving this agenda forward vigorously, but the lack
of activity since suggests that they want to leave this in the private realm.164
A pharmacist testiﬁed before Congress that “the integrity of the drugs and the regulatory system [in Canada]
is beyond question.”165 He stated, “Canadian pharmacies buy pharmaceuticals directly from manufacturers
and from prescription drug wholesalers, the same sources that are used by pharmacies in this country. Canada
has a ﬁrst class drug regulatory scheme and no questions have been raised with respect to the integrity of
the Canadian drug supply.”166 He supported reimportation of drugs from Canada where the local U.S. and
Canadian pharmacies worked in cooperation.167 His plan, involving cooperation by physicians on both sides
of the border, closely resembles the one that Wennar’s organization implemented.168 The reimported drug
would then be checked at the pharmacy before customer pick-up, or the patient could bring it in after home
delivery.169 He also insisted that this program would apply only to drugs that are “the same as those available
160See id. at 42.
161See id. at 43.
162See id.
163See id. at 51.
164As discussed below, the bills currently pending in Congress that are pushing these anti-counterfeiting measures most
vigorously are ones trying to make reimportation safe.
165Reimportation Hearings, supra note 10, at 80 (statement by Don Copeland, President, Associated Pharmacies, Inc.).
166Id. at 83.
167See id. at 80.
168See id. at 81.
169See id. at 83.
30here in the United States” and would have “a very limited formulary of life-saving, necessary drugs.”170
Switching to a supply chain of approved importers and exporters combined with regular product testing
could meet the requirement of no additional risk. After all, it is not true that only the status quo is safe and
eﬀective. The mandate in MMA hinges on whether there is an “additional risk” to public health and safety.
Therefore, safe commercial reimportation is feasible, just costly.171 Indeed, safety currently is—and under
a reimportation law would remain—a choice made along a range of alternatives. A certain amount of risk
in any drug purchase is inevitable, and Hubbard does, under questioning, list some mechanisms that could
reduce to the risk to a level that FDA can tolerate—in fact, these mechanisms are exactly the ones that
reimportation legislation has proposed.172 The likely conclusion is that FDA for political reasons will not
certify the safety of reimportation no matter which devices any legislation incorporates. One article claims
that drug makers “had prepared themselves for the worst” because a Kerry victory in the November 2004
election would have allowed reimportation and made “the federal government be more involved in setting
drug prices by negotiating with drugs makers.”173 Bush’s victory led to “satisfaction” and removed “for now
the spectre of government involvement in drug prices.”174 However, reimportation remains a hot issue, and
one “senior drug executive says that the industry has just two years to make the current plan work before
it would be dragged back into talk of more radical change” as the “huge costs associated with the Medicare
drug plan” kick in.175
2. FDA Lacks Resources to Deal with Reimportation
170Id. at 83, 93.
171See id. at 23.
172Reimportation Hearings, supra note 10, at 34 (discussing secured pedigrees, testing, and licensing).
173Edward Alden et al., Corporate America Hopes the Clearer Republican Mandate Will Ease the Passage of Favourable
Legislation in Areas Such as Tort Reform and Healthcare, Financial Times, Nov. 5, 2004, at 17.
174Id.
175Id.
31In the Reimportation Hearings, PhRMA also warned, “FDA already is overwhelmed by the volume of drug
imports coming into this country” and that the prevention of reimportation “is an important tool to help
FDA stem the tide of violative products.”176 The question of FDA resources is a signiﬁcant one, and any
serious reimportation proposal will have to increase FDA’s budget in response.177
The Task Force noted that “there have been limited reports of harm from imported drugs, despite the
signiﬁcant number of current illegal imports, in part because there is no system in place to determine
whether an imported drug caused an adverse event.”178 The apparent lack of harm could mean that the
medical community is not looking for harm caused by imported drugs, at least not separately from side
eﬀects caused by the drug itself. However, it may also simply mean that current drug importation does not
harm the vast majority of the Americans who engage in it.
Having certiﬁed commercial players involved, utilizing new technologies to screen packages more easily, and
restricting the list of drugs that may be reimported all make enforcement an easier task. Moreover, the phar-
macy accreditation system would decrease FDA’s enforcement costs greatly. Signiﬁcantly, this accreditation
could be done privately, similarly to the way that hospitals are regulated, through an accreditation organi-
zation that would require certain standards, conduct site visits, and act as a gatekeeper in conjunction with
FDA.179 Bar codes or RFID could rotate regularly to foil counterfeiters, and FDA and Customs could simply
prohibit shipments without approval from entering the country. To enable this, reimportation legislation also
should make sure that procedural requirements do not handcuﬀ FDA unnecessarily in applying these rules.
176Id. at 71.
177See below for the complete discussion on resources necessary for legal importation.
178Task Force Report, supra note 32, at 17.
179Reimportation Hearings, supra note 10, at 91 (statement of Wennar).
32Otherwise, FDCA § 801(a) could consume large resources if FDA must provide notice and opportunity for
hearing whenever it seizes a drug appearing to be unapproved or misbranded. Instead, a statute enabling
reimportation should shift the burden from the FDA to the importer/exporter if the drug does not meet the
safety criteria (approved list of drugs, anticounterfeiting measures, etc.). At the same time, it is important
to recognize that the cost of many of these anticounterfeiting technologies could be passed down to drug
buyers.
Because legalization would increase the number of packages subject to inspection, the government should
commit to additional FDA employees for foreign inspections and mail center surveillance as well as central-
ize the mail processing of drugs. It appears feasible to commit the necessary resources if the U.S. legalizes
commercial reimportation, but if Congress legalizes personal reimportation, the number of packages could
increase by millions of shipments a year, and there is no way that the government could hire enough per-
sonnel to guarantee the same level of safety as it could under a commercial reimportation without incurring
unbearable costs.
3. A Cooperative Future?
Theoretically, a standardized international approval process for drugs would eliminate many of the concerns
raised over diﬀerences between foreign and domestic versions of drugs. On the issue of cooperation with
foreign governments, the Task Force pointed out that governments monitor drugs intended for export or
transshipment less than drugs for their own citizens.180 Currently, FDA does little inspection of drug
180See Task Force Report, supra note 32, at 60.
33manufacturers’ foreign plants for drugs intended for U.S. use, and it does not have any regular testing program
for manufacturers’ products. Imported drugs therefore may not deserve signiﬁcantly greater suspicion than
the large number of drugs manufactured abroad for sale in the U.S. In fact, FDA often relies on foreign
counterparts to conduct inspections in the EU, Canada, Switzerland, Japan, and Australia.181 The Task
Force contradicts itself as well by stretching to justify the current reimportation by drug manufacturers—it
claims that the U.S. manufacturer uniquely has the “suﬃcient familiarity” to recognize compromised quality
or integrity.182 The standing policy relies on “documentation that the product is authentic, has been properly
handled, and is (as necessary) relabeled for the U.S. market.”183
When the Task Force outlined potential changes to FDCA’s § 501’s adulteration requirement of current good
manufacturing practice (“GMP”), it made the general point that the foreign supply chain, from manufacture
to processing, packaging, and storage, is not subject to FDA inspection.184 At the same time, FDA largely
relies on the good faith of drug manufacturers because it simply does not have the resources to ensure GMP
in all of the foreign factories that manufacturers employ.185 Therefore, this may be more of a formal concern
than a practice-based one, but formal authority matters for maintaining the integrity of FDA’s inspection
system. Nevertheless, if opponents of drug reimportation were serious about making safety the number one
priority, then they would require all drugs sold in the U.S. to be manufactured domestically, where plants are
inspected most frequently. They also would not continue to allow manufacturers to import “as much as 80
percent of the bulk pharmaceutical chemicals used by U.S. manufacturers to produce prescription drugs.”186
181FDA, CDER Report to the Nation 47 (2003), at http://www.fda.gov/cder/
reports/rtn/2003/rtn2003.pdf.
182See Task Force Report, supra note 32, at 38.
183Id. at 37.
184See id. at 29.
185See GAO, GAO/HEHS-98-21, Food and Drug Administration: Improvements Needed in the Foreign Drug Inspec-
tion Program 4, Mar. 1998. The GAO reported that routine inspections of foreign pharmaceutical manufacturers occurred
far less frequently than the domestic inspections required every two years. See id.
186Id. at 1.
34This practice doubtlessly allows the drug industry to manufacture drugs as cheaply as possible, and it is
unclear why these two potential sources of hazard to American patients are tolerated.
Assuming then that the beneﬁt of foreign manufacturing is greater than the risks, it could be to the drug
industry’s beneﬁt to internationalize drug regulatory systems. Compliance costs would decrease, and the
greater eﬃciencies from internationalization could beneﬁt patients as well. Many commentators have noted
that the Canadian FDA enjoys the same legitimacy as the American FDA, and other countries could pre-
sumably meet a similarly-high standard.187 Solutions to these cooperation issues could include an updated
Mutual Recognition Agreement, in which nations would agree to recognize others’ regulatory processes, or
a Memorandum of Understanding to allow inspection and review by FDA.188 However, previous attempts
at internationalization failed, and it is doubtful that an Administration hostile to drug importation would
enter into this type of agreement.189
E. Pending Legislation
1. Proposals to Reimport U.S. Versions of Drugs Safely
The proposed reimportation bills pending in Congress employ many of the commonly-discussed safety mech-
anisms. They all require registration of the exporter, importer, or both and rely on redundant requirements
to achieve safety.190 The Safe IMPORT Act, a Republican bill, allows personal reimportation from licensed
187See Angell, supra note 43, at 222.
188See Task Force Report, supra note 32, at 62.
189See Gregory Shaﬀer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals, 9 Colum. J. Eur. L. 29 (2002) (describing the positives
and limitations of the FDA-EU Mutual Recognition Agreement).
190The bills discussed include: Safe Importation of Medical Products and Other Rx Therapies Act, S. 184 and H.R. 753, 109th
Cong. (2005); Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act, S. 334 and H.R. 700, 109th Cong. (2005); Pharmaceutical
Market Access Act, S. 109 and H.R. 328, 109th Cong. (2005); and the ﬁrst section of the Aﬀordable Health Care Act, S. 16,
35pharmacies in Canada or the EU or commercial reimportation by a drug importation facility, pharmacy,
or wholesaler.191 The FDCA’s labeling requirements still apply, and commingling of reimported drugs and
other, nonqualifying drugs is prohibited.192 S. 184 gives HHS power to suspend importation and detain
shipments, requires registration of prescription drug importation facilities, requires recordkeeping, mandates
advance notice of imported drug shipments, and requires pedigrees and electronic track-and-trace technol-
ogy.193
A bipartisan Senate alternative has the backing of multiple high-proﬁle members, including Senators Dorgan,
Snowe, Grassley, Kennedy, McCain, Clinton, Schumer, and Lott. This long, comprehensive bill allows
reimportation by a registered importer (such as a pharmacy or wholesaler) or personal reimportation by an
individual from a registered exporter.194 The registration requirements are extensive and include notiﬁcation
provisions and posting of a bond.195 Exporters must agree to comprehensive inspection access, give prior
notice of shipments, and include anticounterfeiting or track-and-trace technology.196 Importers also must
submit to inspection and take part in verifying the chain of custody.197 Registered importers and exporters
pay fees that support the government personnel taking part in monitoring reimportation.198 Furthermore,
internet sales of prescription drugs gain safety features such as notice of the website’s licensed pharmacists and
a prohibition on sales without appropriate medical relationships.199 States can ﬁle suit to enjoin behavior that
109th Cong. (2005).
191See Safe Importation of Medical Products and Other Rx Therapies Act, S. 184, 109th Cong. § 2(a)(2) (2005) (amending
FDCA §§ 812–13).
192See id. This bill would regulate Internet pharmacy transactions and license pharmacies. See id. at § 4.
193See id. at §§ 5–9, 15 (amending FDCA § 503). This generally implements the recommendations of the FDA Counterfeit
Drug Task Force.
194See Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act, S. 334, 109th Cong. § 4 (2005) (amending FDCA § 804(a)).
Permitted countries include Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, New Zealand, and Switzerland. See id.
195See id. (amending § 804(b)).
196See id. (amending § 804(d)).
197See id. (amending § 804(e)).
198See id. (amending §§ 804(e)–(f)).
199See id. § 8 (adding FDCA § 503B).
36violates these requirements, which may then trigger a nationwide injunction on the site.200 S. 334 gives HHS
strong enforcement powers over drugs denied admission and removes burdensome notice requirements.201
A Senate Democratic bill aimed at increasing aﬀordability of health care employs essentially the same
reimportation scheme as S. 334 does.202
Four ﬁrst-term Senators also propose a bill that retains most of the same characteristics but adds Israel and
South Africa to S. 334’s list of permissible exporting countries.203 Again, S. 109 implements most of the
suggestions of the Counterfeit Drug Task Force, such as anti-counterfeiting technologies, although there is
no mention of track-and-trace.204 It also places the burden on drug importers to test a statistically-adequate
amount of the imports.205
2. Proposals for Importation of Non-U.S. Drug Versions
The proposals in Congress also are open to importation beyond versions of drugs approved in the U.S.
For instance, S. 184 creates a compassionate use exemption for personal importation of a drug not approved
under FDCA § 505 if it is “for continuation of personal use by the individual for treatment, begun in a foreign
country, of a serious medical condition.”206 S. 109 states that it wants to allow importation “only if the
drugs and facilities where such drugs are manufactured are approved by the Food and Drug Administration,”
but it retains a personal importation provision that allows a two-week imported supply of drugs, even from
200See id.
201See id. § 5 (adding FDCA § 805).
202See Aﬀordable Health Care Act, S. 16, 109th Cong. § 103 (2005) (amending FDCA § 804).
203See Pharmaceutical Markets Access Act, S. 109, 109th Cong. § 4 (2005).
204See id. § 6 (adding FDCA § 505B).
205See id. § 4(e).
206See Safe Importation of Medical Products and Other Rx Therapies Act, S. 184, 109th Cong. § 2(a)(2) (2005) (amending
FDCA § 812).
37a non-permitted country.207
By contrast, S. 334/S.16 explicitly allows not only reimportation, as discussed above, but also importation of
currently unapproved versions of NDAs. Qualifying drugs are those that have the same active ingredient(s),
route of administration, dosage, and strength as a U.S. label drug.208 However, manufacturers must inform
the government of how the drugs they export to qualifying countries diﬀer from their U.S. equivalents beyond
variations already provided for in the FDCA § 505 application or any diﬀerence in labeling.209 The drug
manufacturer pays a fee if the diﬀerence would require submission of a supplemental application if made as a
change to the U.S. drug under FDCA § 506A.210 After review, FDA may approve the foreign version using an
FDCA § 506A safe and eﬀective standard, and it may include on the label that the drug is safe and eﬀective
but not bioequivalent if that is the case.211 Manufacturers must submit § 505(b) applications for approval
for diﬀerences in active ingredient, route of administration, dosage form, or strength.212 Clearly, the authors
of this legislation have anticipated some of the types of technical workarounds that drug companies might
consider to frustrate reimportation.213 S. 334 would not allow importation of non-U.S. versions without ﬁrst
requiring some sort of FDA certiﬁcation of safety, but its approach poses multiple diﬃculties for the drug
industry. First, it places a ﬁnancial burden on them to seek approval of foreign versions of a drug, which
may be diﬀerent because of diﬀerent regulatory requirements. It assumes a bad faith that may not actually
be the case. Second, the diﬀerent types of drugs may cause consumer confusion without an accompanying
207See Pharmaceutical Markets Access Act, S. 109, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).
208See Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act, S. 334, 109th Cong. § 4 (2005) (amending FDCA § 804(a)).
209See id. (amending FDCA § 804(g)(2)).
210See id. If the manufacturer certiﬁes a diﬀerence that would require meeting the supplemental application standard, reim-
portation is halted until HHS decides whether to permit reimportation or not. FDCA § 506A governs manufacturing changes
and requires submission of a supplemental application if the change has “substantial potential to adversely aﬀect the iden-
tity, strength, quality, purity, or potency of the drug as they may relate to the safety or eﬀectiveness of a drug.” 21 U.S.C.
§ 356A(c)(2) (2005). This includes a change in the “qualitative or quantitative formulation of the drug involved or in the
speciﬁcations in the approved application” or a change that HHS determines requires “completion of an appropriate clinical
study demonstrating equivalence.” Id. § 356A(c)(2)(A)–(B).
211See Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act, S. 334, 109th Cong. § 4 (2005) (amending FDCA § 804(g)).
212See id.
213See id. § 4 (2005) (amending FDCA § 804(a)).
38educational campaign. Implicitly, this bill also assumes that drug manufacturers will continue to manufacture
drugs for the U.S. because of the size of the American market. Theoretically, however, some manufacturers
may shift their focus to other markets or delay entry into the U.S. Moreover, there may be a “race to the
bottom” as diﬀerent manufacturers seek out the lowest acceptable international standards as long as their
drugs will be sold in the U.S., albeit at a decreased proﬁt. The internationalization of the regulatory process
discussed above may be the only way to make sure that this race to the bottom is not pernicious.
Ultimately, these bills show that Congress, utilizing the Counterfeit Drug and Importation Task Force
Reports, remains determined to pursue reimportation and to do so safely by integrating various process
requirements. One author points out that drug companies have failed once before when relying on a “safety
argument” to promote their agenda. As government considered repealing the antisubstitution laws that
prevented substitution of a brand name drug, the industry argued that generic substitution was unsafe.214
However, it failed because “[p]ublic opinion was strongly in favor of generic substitution” and because there
were “no obvious examples of dangerous generic drugs.”215 Public opinion polls suggest that PhRMA is in
the same situation today given the popularity of reimportation.
Part V. Argument #2: Reimportation Will Decrease Research &
Development
PhRMA and other opponents of reimportation frequently warn of a second consequence: the decreased
214See Christopher S. Harrison, The Politics of the International Pricing of Prescription Drugs 52 (2004).
215Id. at 55.
39revenue from reimportation will lead to a decrease in research and development (“R&D”).216 By breaking
down the ability of drug manufacturers to price discriminate, the argument goes, reimportation will decrease
revenue, which inevitably will lead to less R&D. Drug manufacturers have consistently raised this possibility
in opposing any mechanism that would exert downward control on the price of drugs in the U.S. Alan
Holmer, testifying in 2000 about adding a prescription drug beneﬁt to Medicare, argued that government price
controls, whether direct or through formularies, “would inevitably harm our ability to bring new medicines to
patients.”217 Although one professor, Alan Sager, described this message as “‘a terror tactic,”’ this remains a
powerful objection because reimportation usually involves the most-innovative (and highest-priced) drugs.218
At the same time, there are powerful incentives for PhRMA to maintain its R&D expenditures, high levels
of R&D are crucial to the drug industry’s public image, and the industry could maintain much or all of its
current R&D spending if it makes adjustments in its business model. The Task Force Report concluded that
reimportation could lead to a decrease in the loss of innovative new drugs every year or two, and while this
is a very rough estimate, it does point out that policymakers may rationally decide that the sacriﬁce is an
acceptable trade-oﬀ for access.219
A. How much do drug manufacturers really spend on research and development?
One frequently-cited Tufts study claims that the cost of bringing a new drug to market cost was over $800
216See, e.g., Patricia M. Danzon, Pharmaceutical Price Regulation 85 (1997).
217Hearing on the Inclusion of a Prescription Drug Beneﬁt in the Medicare Program Before the Senate Finance Comm., 106th
Cong. 5 (2000) (prepared statement of Alan F. Holmer, President and CEO, PhRMA), at http://www.senate.gov/∼ﬁnance/3-
22phrm.pdf. As an initial response, it is deceptive to describe formularies as a price control—formularies may prioritize other
criteria, such as safety and eﬀectiveness.
218Greider, supra note 50, at 44.
21935 U.S.C. § 154 (1994); Task Force Report, supra note 32, at xi. Of course, the need to study drugs and navigate the
regulatory process decreases the length of the eﬀective market monopoly to around twelve years. See Scherer, supra note 61,
at 927.
40million in 2001.220 Another study by Bain Consulting pegged the ﬁgure at $1.7 billion per successful drug
launch.221 Many economists analyzing R&D expenditures subsequently seized on this $800 million ﬁgure in
many of their discussions of the pharmaceutical market.222 However, multiple authors have called the $800
million ﬁgure into question, suggesting that bringing a drug to market is far cheaper and weakening one
of drug manufacturer’s chief defenses for the price discrepancies between the U.S. and other industrialized
Western nations.
Merrill Goozner, a journalist with an economics background, investigated the true cost of bringing a new
compound through the R&D process. He ﬁrst of all explains the origins of the Tufts University Center for
the Study of Drug Development, which “was started in the mid-1980s by a group of economists who were
largely funded by the drug industry.”223 He also points out that their methodology includes opportunity
cost of capital, which perhaps wrongly assumes that drug manufacturers would have spent the money they
220See Naomi Aoki, R&D Costs for Drugs Skyrocket, Study Says, Boston Globe, Dec. 1, 2001, at C1.
221Gilbert, Jim, Preston Henske & Ashish Singh, Rebuilding Big Pharma’s Business Model, In Vivo, Nov. 2003, at
http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/cms/Marketing/
rebuilding big pharma.pdf. The main point of the article is to question the sustainability of the drug industry’s current
blockbuster-based business model, with the new cost estimate appearing as a three-page sidebar. In Vivo is a trade journal
and not a peer-reviewed scientiﬁc journal, unlike the one the Tufts study appeared in. The $1.7 billion total does not include
only the cost of R&D; $250 million of the total is launch costs, which has to deal more with marketing and production. See id.
at 4. The Bain ﬁgure therefore is at most $1.45 billion for a new drug, based mostly on “recent performance data” showing a
“dramatic decline in productivity” in PhRMA’s R&D. Id. It is hard to analyze the validity of this ﬁgure because it does not
have the Tufts study’s meticulous explanation of its methodology. It appears to include cost of capital (discussed in more detail
below), and it claims that the diﬀerence between it and earlier studies mainly lies in the fact it focuses on the less-productive
period of 1997-2001, while previous studies included 1983-2000. The Bain analysis also explicitly includes decreased return on
detailing, which is not an R&D expenditure. Without greater transparency, it is hard to comment further on the estimate other
than to say that R&D may be becoming less eﬃcient, which would certainly raise costs; that the recent ineﬃciency may be a
mere blip that the drug industry’s strong R&D departments will overcome; and that the $1.7 billion ﬁgure might reﬂect the
overall business cost to the company, which appropriately reﬂects the bottom-line interests of the executives who read In Vivo
but is not an apples-to-apples comparison to the Tufts study. This estimate also does not account for the beneﬁt of R&D tax
breaks.
222See, e.g., Bruce N. Kuhlik, Colloquium: The Assault on Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 93, 94
(2004); Shanker A. Singham & D. Daniel Sokol, Sixth Annual International Roundtable on Competition & Trade Policy: Public
Sector Restraints: Behind-the-Border Trade Barriers, 39 Tex. Int’l L.J. 625, 629 (2004).
223Merrill Goozner, The $800 Million Pill 237 (2004). The Tufts Center has received money from companies like Merck,
Pﬁzer, and Bayer.
41invested in R&D in other ways.224 The Tufts group made a 1991 estimate including opportunity cost of $318
million in 2000 dollars; ten years later, that ﬁgure had increased to $802 million.225 The biggest increase
in costs, from $104 million to $467 million, came in clinical and not preclinical expenditures.226 The Tufts
authors also estimate that post-approval R&D costs $140 million per approved drug, which they explain is
twenty-six percent of the total R&D cost (or eleven percent if capitalized).227
Goozner is skeptical of the explanation that rising clinical costs could account for such a large increase, citing
the fact that the National Institute for Allergies and Infectious Diseases ran over 1700 clinical trials during
the same period and experienced only an eleven percent average cost per enrollee for the entire decade.228
He also refers to an estimate that drug manufacturers spent $1.5 billion in 2000 to test drugs already
approved.229 Three other publications have also cast doubt on the $800 million ﬁgure, with estimates that
are less than a third of the Tufts number. Public Citizen, a consumer rights group, attacked the earlier 1991
Tufts study for the assumptions it made and utilized a diﬀerent methodology to estimate R&D cost. Public
Citizen concluded that in the 1990s, it cost only about $70 million after taxes for the average new drug,
including failures, and less than $150 million for New Molecular Entities (“NMEs”).230 The lower estimate
reﬂected the fact that Public Citizen subtracts the tax deductions that R&D receives and views R&D as
less risky than commonly supposed.231 Public Citizen calculated that the drug industry’s eﬀective tax rate
was about sixteen percent compared to twenty-seven percent for all industries from 1996-99.232 The Tufts
224See id.
225Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation, 22 J. of Health Econ. 151, 167 (2003).
226See id.
227See id. at 173.
228Goozner, supra note 223, at 238. Not all of these trials were Phase III studies, the most important and most expensive
type.
229See id.
230Public Citizen, Rx R&D Myths: The Case Against the Drug Industry’s R&D ‘Scare Card,’ Congress Watch, Nov. 2001,
i, 7.
231See id. at ii.
232See id. at 15.
42study used unveriﬁed industry data, and it focused only on new molecules, which are the most expensive
to develop but are less common drug targets.233 Public Citizen complained that drug manufacturers keep
R&D numbers secret, which makes their claims that R&D will suﬀer diﬃcult to interpret.234
Angell criticized the drug industry’s lack of transparency on R&D spending and deconstructed the Tufts
study as well.235 She excluded the capitalized cost because drug companies really do not have the ability to
invest the money instead of spending it on R&D.236 Angell also pointed out that “R&D expenses are fully
tax deductible” and that drug companies receive “a number of tax credits worth billions.”237 The Global
Alliance for TB Drug Development, which is interested in stimulating innovation in TB drugs, published an
extremely detailed analysis of the estimated costs for developing a new TB drug. Including estimated failure
costs, the Global Alliance estimates that an NME would cost between $115 and $240 million to bring to the
market in 2001.238
The point of this discussion is not to pin down the exact cost of bringing an NME through R&D to the market.
Instead, it is to point out that one of the basic presumptions made in all discussions of drug importation,
reimportation, and price control is that pharmaceutical R&D is prohibitively expensive, requiring extremely
high revenues. Undoubtedly, drug manufacturers make many signiﬁcant, innovative products, and this
process is expensive, especially for the most-innovative drugs. However, this process is not as expensive as
advertised. Overstating the cost of R&D has several beneﬁts for PhRMA—ﬁrst, it stymies eﬀorts to lower
233See id. at 2-3.
234See id. at 10.
235Angell, supra note 43, at 38. The Tufts study sampled data from ten voluntary companies who mostly were members of Big
Pharma who “placed a disproportionate emphasis on drugs for chronic diseases, which require extensive testing.” See Scherer,
supra note 61, at 928.
236Angell, supra note 43, at 44.
237See id. at 45.
238Global Alliance for TB Drug Development, The Economics of TB Drug Development, Oct. 2001, at 66.
43drug prices; second, it improves PhRMA’s image; third, R&D is considered “untouchable,” so expenses
categorized under R&D typically escape outside scrutiny.
B. Who provides and pays for innovation?
Furthermore, the argument that reducing drug prices will decrease R&D does not account for the fact that
much of the innovation comes as the fruit of a public-private partnership. Drug companies spend billions of
valuable R&D dollars, but they usually pursue drugs in cooperation with government-funded basic science
research. This means that a continued government commitment to funding research will keep a steady stream
of promising basic science developments available for drug companies to do what they do best: develop and
commercialize.
Many blockbuster drugs began as publicly-funded research, such as synthetic erythropoietin, AZT, and
taxol.239 Of course, the industry subsequently developed those basic science discoveries into marketable
drugs. In 2003, the government funded $27 billion of medical research (compared to the drug industry’s $30
billion) in NIH labs and through grants. Moreover, “NIH-funded research played not only the key role in
virtually all of the basic scientiﬁc breakthroughs that underpin modern medicine but also a central role in
the application of those ﬁndings to the search for many new therapies.”240 Angell estimates that “[a]t
least a third of big pharma’s drugs are now licensed or otherwise acquired from outside sources.”241 She also
cites an unpublished internal NIH document that examined the ﬁve top-selling drugs in 1995 and found that
sixteen of the seventeen key scientiﬁc papers (and eighty-ﬁve percent of the total number of papers) came
239See Goozner, supra note 223, at 13-38, 114-25.
240Id. at 8.
241Angell, supra note 43, at 57 (2004).
44from outside of the drug industry.242 Other reports by the National Bureau of Economic Research and the
Boston Globe came to similar conclusions.243 Some drug manufacturers have claimed that many European
companies are relocating their R&D to the U.S. because of the lack of price regulation here. On closer review,
this claim does not make sense because the proximity of R&D to the marketplace seems irrelevant. Angell
surmises that it is more likely because of “the unparalleled research output of American universities and
the NIH.”244 Therefore, innovation in drug development is a public-private enterprise, with public funding
providing the critical basic science raw materials. However, critics of the drug industry should also not forget
the second part of the equation, which is what manufacturers provide. One group noted that the private
sector uniquely has the ability to engage in “preclinical development, production process development, and
manufacturing.”245
1. Bayh-Dole Act
The pervasive impact that the Bayh-Dole Act has had on pharmaceutical innovation demonstrates that while
drug manufacturers do take on R&D risk, they also receive critical federal support and partnership in the
endeavor. Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act “to use the patent system to promote the utilization of inven-
tions arising from federally supported research or development,” speciﬁcally to encourage collaboration with
small businesses and universities.246 The Bayh-Dole Act was supposed to “promote the commercialization
242See id. at 64-65.
243See id. The National Bureau of Economic Research found that public research was responsible for two-thirds of the
twenty-one most eﬀective drugs approved from 1965 to 1992, and the Globe found government funding for forty-ﬁve of the ﬁfty
best-selling drugs approved between 1992 to 1997.
244See id. at xvii.
245Global Alliance, supra note 238, at 86.
24635 U.S.C. § 200 (2005). Reagan extended Bayh-Dole to large businesses as well, which is how the Act has come to provide
such a large beneﬁt to the drug industry. See Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Government
Patent Policy, Pub. Papers 248 (Feb. 18, 1983); Exec. Order No. 12,591, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,414 (1997). Apparently, adding large
businesses in the original act would have led to its failure. See Bradley Graham, Patent Bill Seeks Shift to Bolster Innovation,
Wash. Post, Apr. 8, 1979, at M1.
45and public availability of inventions made in the United States by United States industry and labor” while
also ensuring that the government “obtains suﬃcient rights in federally supported inventions to meet the
needs of the Government and protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions.”247 The
Act requires each contractor to disclose the invention to the applicable federal agency, which then has “a
nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have practiced for or on behalf of
the United States any subject invention throughout the world.”248 The federal agency also has “march-in”
rights, so it may require the contractor to “grant a nonexclusive, partially exclusive, or exclusive license in
any ﬁeld of use to a responsible applicant or applicants, upon terms that are reasonable under the circum-
stances,” and if the contractor refuses, the agency may grant such a license itself in certain circumstances.249
The relevant agency also may obtain patent protection for an invention in which the federal government owns
an interest, and it may grant licenses “royalty-free or for royalties or other consideration” as appropriate for
the public interest.250
In many ways, Bayh-Dole has succeeded because it sped the transfer of innovation from research laboratories
to the pharmacy. Giving high-quality basic science research to drug companies at extremely low prices has
led to the predicted result.251 However, federal grant managers have lost track of which drugs are paid
24735 U.S.C. § 200 (2005).
24835 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1), 202(c)(4) (2005). The federal agency also has the right to require periodic reporting on utilization
eﬀorts, and the contractor must declare government support when ﬁling a U.S. patent application. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(5)–(6).
24935 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2005). The agency must determine that the action is necessary because of lack of progress, the need
to alleviate health or safety needs, failure to meet public use requirements, or breach of contract. See id. Furthermore, the
contractor shall not grant an exclusive right to use or sell in the U.S. unless manufacture is “substantially in the United States.”
35 U.S.C. § 204 (2005).
25035 U.S.C. § 207 (2005). It may grant this license “only if” the license is a “reasonable and necessary incentive” to draw the
requisite investment to create a practical application or to promote public utilization; also, the public must be served by the
granting of the license, the license applicant must achieve practical application in a reasonable time, and the license must not
violate antitrust law. See 35 U.S.C. § 209 (2005).
251See, e.g., Irene R. Dubowy, Subsidies Code, TRIPs Agreement, and Technological Development, J. of Tech. L. & Pol’y
33, 58 (2003). Another statute, the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act, focused on the right for federal laboratories
to enter into cooperative research and development agreements with U.S. industry and research institutions. See Mark R.
Wisner, Recent Development: Proposed Changes to the Laws Governing Ownership of Inventions Made with Federal Funding,
2 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 193, 194 (1994).
46for by taxpayer money, drawing the General Accounting Oﬃce’s criticism.252 Enforcement of Bayh-Dole’s
provisions is left up to separate federal agencies, and “it appears that funding grantees have engaged in a
more or less wholesale ﬂouting of their responsibilities to self-report, which has resulted in a kind of land
grab in which researchers receive funding but uniformly fail to include the Bayh-Dole legend in any resulting
patents.”253 NIH justiﬁed this change by prioritizing rapid discoveries over monetary return on investment,
judging this to be in the interests of the Bayh-Dole Act.254 As a result, NIH terminated in 1995 its 1989
attempt to require a reasonable relationship between price and public investment and public health and
safety needs.255 House attempts to reinstate the requirement failed in the Senate in 2001 and 2002.256
In a 2000 series on the drug industry, the New York Times focused in part on how government subsidies
decrease the cost of R&D. Much of the discussion focused on the Bayh-Dole Act, which Congress intended
to “push federally ﬁnanced research from the university laboratory into the marketplace.”257 The article
focused on Xalatan, a glaucoma treatment, which Pharmacia bought from a researcher at Columbia for
$150,000 and which, after Pharmacia spent in the tens of millions to develop the drug, became a $500
million a year drug.258
252See Jeﬀ Gerth & Sheryl G. Stolberg, Medicine Merchants: Birth of a Blockbuster, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 2000, at A1.
253Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don’t We Enforce Existing Drug Price Controls?, 75 Tul. L. Rev. 631, 648–49
(2001).
254NIH, NIH Response to Conference Report Request For a Plan to Ensure Taxpayers’ Interests Are Protected, July 2001, at
http://www.nih.gov/news/070101wyden.htm (last viewed Mar. 16, 2005).
255See Angell, supra note 43, at 69-71.
256Avorn, supra note 96, at 199–200.
257Jeﬀ Gerth & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Drug Companies Proﬁt From Research Supported By Taxpayers, N.Y. Times, July 23,
2000, at http://www.nytimes.com/library/national/science/
health/042300hth-drugs.html. The Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. 96-517 (1980), is codiﬁed in its most up-to-date version in 35 U.S.C.
§§ 200-11, 301-307 (2005).
258See id. Gleevec, a Novartis drug, became the focus of a direct-to-consumer advertising campaign that was not for the drug
(a cancer drug without any direct competitors) but really for “the company itself—and the virtues of the drug industry as a
whole.” Stephen S. Hall, The Drug Lords, N.Y. Times Book Review, Nov. 14, 2004, at 8.
47Critics of the Bayh-Dole Act believe that it may not be structured optimally for achieving its originally stated
goals. Eisenberg points out that the federal government promotes patenting federally-sponsored inventions
wherever they are made and that the discoveries in the public domain “are those that slip through.”259 This
policy may be “counterintuitive” because: (1) allowing private ﬁrms to hold exclusive rights to inventions
generated at public expense “seems to require the public to pay twice”; (2) granting exclusive rights “contra-
venes the conventional wisdom that patent rights on existing inventions result in a net social loss ex post, a
loss we endure only to preserve ex ante incentives”; (3) promoting private appropriation “calls into question
the public goods rationale for public funding of research”; and (4) the end result may be the impoverishment
of the public domain of research science.260 However, Congress already considered the ﬁrst two issues in
passing Bayh-Dole, so the debate on those two points has been resolved to a great extent.261 The end
result of Bayh-Dole as currently practiced could be that “the public may be failing to get full value from its
substantial investment of tax dollars in research.”262 However, NIH has concluded that publicly-subsidized
research “repays taxpayers through the marketing of new products.”263 Eisenberg’s research also undercuts
the belief that the government was slow to transfer its technology for commercial drug development pre-
Bayh-Dole, but she acknowledges that the current technology transfer system has become entrenched and
that a minority of scholars believe that the primary value of patents is in incentivizing subsequent R&D, not
ex ante investment.264
259Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Symposium on Regulating Medical Innovation: Public Research and Private Development, 82 Va.
L. Rev. 1663, 1666 (1996).
260Id. at 1666–67.
261See id. at 1667.
262Id. at 1668. The federal government sponsored thirty-six percent of all national R&D outlays and nearly ﬁfty-eight percent
of basic research in 1995. Bayh-Dole may also undermine the primary justiﬁcation for the patent system because the “equitable
arguments for rewarding research performers with patent rights have less force than when private ﬁrms have put their own
capital at risk to make the inventions. . . . The public has paid for these inventions and absorbed the risk that nothing would
come of its investment.” See id. at 1668.
263Arno & Davis, supra note 253, at 670.
264See Eisenberg, supra note 259, at 1669–70, 1703, 1727. She also argues that the provisions of Bayh-Dole and Stevenson-
Wydler undercut the belief that the government was an incompetent licensor because the legislation actually tried to expand
the government’s licensing role. See id. at 1706–1707.
48Other authors conclude that “these public-private relationships all too frequently rest on untested and
unsupported assumptions and that, even accepting those assumptions on faith, the mechanisms established
to police these public-private relationships have been either ignored or misunderstood” leaving the fruits of
the American public’s investments susceptible to abuse.265 Arno and Davis call for a radical reinvocation of
Bayh-Dole’s “ordinary meaning” provision, proposing a requirement that the resulting drug be available to
the public at reasonable terms;266 this means that the federal government can “review the prices of drugs
developed with public funding” and must “march-in when prices exceed a reasonable level,” which means
that either the unit price is too high or use over the long term “makes it too costly with respect to the
investment, costs, and proﬁts of the manufacturer.”267
Although Arno and Davis’s reading of Bayh-Dole may be a justiﬁable interpretation of statutory language,
it does not necessarily make for good policy. As Eisenberg pointed out, Bayh-Dole has become a ﬁxture in
the American drug development process, which has been successful over the past twenty years. A former
pharmaceutical executive said that after Bayh-Dole, academic scientists have become more commercially
oriented, allowing companies to “shift resources away from in-house research and development and toward
outside collaborations.”268 Eisenberg concludes that this departure from pre-Bayh-Dole practice means that
as university patenting and private funding of academic research increases, universities will engage more
and more in discoveries with commercial application, which is research that would draw private funding
even without Bayh-Dole. She describes the result as “‘corporate welfare.”’269 Some members of Congress,
which has shown more support for decreasing drug prices than the current Administration, might agree
265Arno & Davis, supra note 253, at 635-36.
266Id. at 649.
267Id. at 651. The authors dismiss NIH’s contention that price review is “beyond its ability” as clearly contradicted by
“countless cases and a host of statutes.” Id. at 651–52.
268Gerth and Stolberg, supra note 252, at A1.
269Eisenberg, supra note 259, at 1726.
49and would consider amending the Bayh-Dole Act to decrease the discretionary enforcement of the Act’s
reporting and pricing provisions and lay down guidelines for regulations to determine what makes a drug
price unreasonable. However, this is not the best ﬁx for high drug prices in the U.S. because it opens up the
very diﬃcult question of what makes a drug price “reasonable.” This type of deﬁnitional debate is easier
to resolve in academic circles than in the real world, where there might be an unintended pernicious eﬀect
on innovation. Other ways of addressing drug prices are more straightforward and less likely to disrupt the
current incentive system. Nevertheless, the centrality of Bayh-Dole to modern American drug development
does emphasize that R&D is a more collaborative process than PhRMA normally acknowledges.
2. Tax Breaks
Drug companies also receive substantial tax breaks for R&D, either through provisions targeted to beneﬁt
PhRMA or through use of general tax provisions. For over ﬁfty years, “the tax code has encouraged all U.S.
taxpaying ﬁrms to invest in R&D by allowing them to deduct R&D expenditures from their taxable income.
In addition to tax deductions, ﬁrms receive a variety of tax credits for increasing research expenses.”270 The
Internal Revenue Code allows a taxpayer to treat “research or experimental expenditures” as a deduction or
to amortize them “as deferred expenses . . . over such period of not less than 60 months as may be selected
by the taxpayer.”271
Drug companies also have a tax provision that rewards investment in U.S. territories, so seventeen of the
270Arno & Davis, supra note 253, at 638.
271I.R.C. § 174(a)–(b) (2003).
50twenty-one most commonly prescribed medicines in 1990 were actually produced in Puerto Rico.272 As a
result, the drug industry enjoyed a 1990s eﬀective tax rate of 26 percent, instead of 33 percent for all major
U.S. industries.273 The tax credit for domestic corporations in question applies to the “taxable income, from
sources without the United States” from “active conduct of a trade or business within a possession of the
United States [deﬁned as the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico] or the sale or exchange of substantially all of
the assets used by the taxpayer in the active conduct of such trade or business.”274
These two tax provisions are the most obvious ones that beneﬁt PhRMA, but there have also been signiﬁcant
tax savings “from at least three other tax provisions: the foreign tax credit, the orphan drug tax credit, and
the general business tax credit.”275 Along with the Puerto Rico credit, “between 1990 and 1996, these four
tax provisions generated savings of $ 27.9 billion for the pharmaceutical industry; speciﬁcally, it saved $ 4.5
billion in 1996.”276 However, these tax provisions
do not distinguish between short-term, bottom-line investments and longer-term, riskier
investments that may yield products ﬁfteen or twenty years later. Nor are the provisions
associated with any requirement that the tax credit be used for R&D, rather than for ad-
ministration or marketing expenses. . . . Moreover, there are claims that the pharmaceutical
industry inﬂates its R&D expenses by including administration and marketing costs.277
More recently, several drug manufacturers leaped to take advantage of U.S. tax amnesty on foreign earnings,
with Lilly repatriating $8 billion it accumulated in countries with lower corporate tax rates.278 These
earnings “have grown particularly large in the pharmaceuticals and technology industries because companies
272See Greider, supra note 50, at 60.
273See id. Arno and Davis point out that the drug industry “has received approximately half of the total tax beneﬁts from
section 936.” Arno, supra note 253, at 638. The GAO estimated that from 1980 to 1990, twenty-six drug companies saved
$10.1 billion from Puerto Rico operations, three times greater than the compensation paid to their employees. See id.
274I.R.C. § 936(a)(1) (2005).
275Arno & Davis, supra note 253, at 638–39.
276Id. at 639.
278Dan Roberts, U.S. Tax Amnesty Pushes Eli Lilly Into the Red, Financial Times, Jan. 27, 2005, at 29. The article
mentions that Bristol-Myers Squibb has the same plan, and Johnson & Johnson planned to repatriate $11 billion. In all, U.S.
companies are expected to repatriate about $320 billion in overseas earnings.
51have shifted a large portion of their intellectual property ownership and manufacturing operations to low
tax jurisdictions such as Ireland, Singapore, and Puerto Rico.”279 The amnesty provision allows escape from
the normal corporate tax rate of 35 percent.280 Basic science research is perhaps the most expensive and
riskiest, so American citizens have removed much of the true risk from R&D through NIH research, tax
credits for up to half of research costs, and even lack of enforcement of royalty agreements.281
Again, the point is not to deny the large amount of real research and innovation that the drug industry
produces. However, PhRMA and other opponents of any legislation that would aﬀect drug prices appear to
be overstating the price of research as well as the understating the amount of government subsidies that drug
manufacturers receive in the form of early government-funded research and tax deductions. Strategically,
this makes sense because it gives the drug industry greater rhetorical power to argue that preserving revenue
for R&D is an absolute necessity. At the same time, the industry’s arguments retain much of their power
because regardless of whether the industry overstates its R&D spending, the direction that revenue moves (in
the case of reimportation, a likely deduction) matters as well. However, the beneﬁt of these tax deductions
makes it less likely that decreased revenue would signiﬁcantly aﬀect R&D expenditures.
C. What role should me too drugs play?
One of the most common criticisms of the drug industry is that most of the research in R&D involves “me
too” drugs, which allows drug companies to eat into other companies’ blockbusters by producing drugs in
the same chemical family. While this introduces competition between members of a drug class, this research
279Avorn, supra note 96, at 200.
280See id.
281See id. at 202–203.
52generally is less innovative, and so cutting this type of R&D will have diﬀerent eﬀects on drug types and
supply than cutting R&D on NMEs. At the same time, the presence of drugs that do not win the race to
the ﬁrst in their class provides for two types of choice—ﬁnding a drug that works for a patient who has
failed another member of the drug class and choosing a drug based on price when competitors’ therapeutic
beneﬁts are the same.
Angell criticizes the drug industry for spending money ineﬃciently on its R&D, claiming a disconnect between
spending and value.282 She cites a decrease in the number and quality of new drugs despite increasing R&D
expenditures.283 Using FDA’s classiﬁcation system based on the newness of the molecular entity and the
clinical eﬀect, thirty-two percent of new approved drugs between 1998 and 2003 were NMEs, and only
fourteen percent were NMEs that received priority review.284 The majority of approved drugs are “me
too” drugs—Angell claims the total was as high as seventy-seven percen—that did not oﬀer a signiﬁcant
improvement over existing drugs upon initial review.285 Angell attributes this proliferation of me too drugs
to FDA’s requirement only to show eﬀectiveness, not greater eﬀectiveness than existing drugs.286 One
prominent study that made this type of head-to-head comparison, ALLHAT, showed that generic water pills
were better for hypertension than three new classes of drugs.287 Drug companies distinguish “me too” drugs
“for slightly diﬀerent outcomes in slightly diﬀerent kinds of patients” then promote them “as especially
eﬀective for those uses,” Angell claims.288
282Angell, supra note 43, at 47.
283See id.
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286See id.
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53Angell, a physician, also is skeptical that more than one or two varieties of a drug are necessary to address
variations between patients.289 She recommends a change in FDA regulations to require “new drugs be
compared not just with placebos but with old drugs for the same conditions.”290 She says that this new
pressure “would force the industry to concentrate on innovative drugs instead of me-too drugs,” and it also
would be more ethical by ensuring that human control subjects are receiving an approved treatment.291 This
would result in a greater focus on innovative drugs, fewer clinical trials that actually are marketing tools, and
a decrease in marketing expenditures, since most “are to convince doctors and the public that one me too drug
is better than another.”292 On the other hand, some economists, such as the American Enterprise Institute’s
John Calfee, view practices such as me too drugs, marketing, and advertising as beneﬁcial because they are
revenue-maximizing.293 Furthermore, as discussed below, trying to implement scientiﬁc transparency at the
level of FDA approval is far more complicated than it is afterward.
Avorn argues that the decline in most-innovative drugs is a rational response to the domestic environment,
which rewards heavy promotion of minimally-innovative drugs.294 Additionally, perhaps as much as one-ﬁfth
of R&D represents improvements in or modiﬁcations to existing products, which largely represents “changes
in dosages or delivery systems, or both, in products with expiring patents to impede generic competition
or maintain brand loyalty.”295 These products essentially are attempts to maintain marketability beyond
patent term, and they typically add little beneﬁt to any generic competitor.
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54The National Institute for Health Care Management (“NIHCM”) issued a research report in 2002 that
documented the level of innovation in the American pharmaceutical industry. The report concluded that
from 1989 to 2000, thirty-ﬁve percent of the new drug applications (“NDAs”) approved by FDA were for
NMEs, while incrementally-modiﬁed drugs accounted for ﬁfty-four percent and drugs identical to products
already available accounted for the remaining eleven percent.296 Using FDA priority review as a proxy
for innovation, NIHCM found that twenty-four percent of NDAs received priority review, while only ﬁfteen
percent of incrementally-modiﬁed drugs received priority rating.297 NIHCM concluded that most of the
increased spending on drugs “came from less innovative products,” with standard-rated products accounting
for two-thirds of increased spending on prescription drugs from 1995 to 2000.298 NIHCM again attributes
these results in large parts to the drug industry’s current business model: “Large brand manufacturers have
reached a scale at which they must generate several billion dollars in additional revenue each year in order
to meet Wall Street growth targets.”299 The industry also has become dependent on high-volume sellers.300
This incentivizes the continual introduction of modiﬁed older products, which may be proﬁtable but may
not provide signiﬁcant clinical beneﬁts.
PhRMA issued a detailed critique of NIHCM’s motivations and methodology, pointing out that eleven of
the twelve Board members run Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, which would make them professionally
interested in constraining drug costs.301 PhRMA also lambastes use of the priority review classiﬁcation,
acknowledging that it is reserved for “signiﬁcant” advances but saying that FDA does not view its deter-
296NIHCM, Changing Patterns of Pharmaceutical Innovation 3 (2002), at http://www.nihcm.org/innovations.pdf.
297Id.
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300See id.
301PhRMA, NIHCM’s Report on Pharmaceutical Innovation: Fact vs. Fiction 1, June 11, 2002, at
http://www.phrma.org/publications/quickfacts/2002-06-11.421.pdf. PhRMA says that NIHCM should not have eliminated
vaccines and biologics from its analysis, but it appears legitimate to restrict the inquiry to drugs that do not have to be
administered by a medical professional.
55mination as predictive of ultimate value.302 Also, PhRMA points out that products receiving standard
review may provide signiﬁcant clinical beneﬁt.303 NIHCM justiﬁes its use of the FDA classiﬁcation system
because priority review may indicate a breakthrough drug but also may result from superior safety or for
new formulations and combinations of drugs already on the market.304 The classiﬁcation results from the
best information available at the time of submission, so it does not seem prejudicial either for or against drug
companies because presumably some drugs receiving priority review will not provide the signiﬁcant beneﬁt
expected. The NIHCM study does have imperfections, as PhRMA assiduously points out, but it makes
the critical point that large amounts of R&D is actually not risky but instead represents modiﬁcations and
improvements of existing products.305
The exact percentage of new drugs that are truly innovative is less important than a more complete evalua-
tion of the argument that reimportation would harm future patients by decreasing R&D. The drug industry
argues that me too drugs increase competition and decrease prices, but critics claim there “is almost no
evidence of price competition in the me-too business... because me-too drugs are not promoted on the basis
of price.”306 At the same time, decreased R&D might lead to fewer me too drugs, meaning fewer members of
a drug class and even less potential for price competition. This also may make it more diﬃcult for patients
to ﬁnd a drug that works for them or has a better side eﬀect proﬁle. Me too drugs result in lower prices
to some extent, but as discussed below, most agree that the prices are not as low as would be expected in
a transparent market where drugs compete on the basis of price. Critics of the industry want to encour-
age bolder innovation, but the best way to do this is not through any explicit legislative encroachment on
302See id. at 3.
303See id.
304See NIHCM, supra note 296, at 6.
305PhRMA claims that multiple drugs in a class does lead to lower prices, citing the same DiMasi/Tufts group that made the
$800 million estimate for the price of developing a new drug. That study found discounts for 13 of 20 new drugs entering a
class, which PhRMA oﬀers as proof of price competition. See PhRMA, supra note 301, at 9. However, it seems like true price
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should also include the beneﬁts conferred by new drugs, not just the costs. See id. at 10–11.
306Angell, supra note 43, at 89.
56R&D autonomy. Instead, price and scientiﬁc transparency would decrease prices for me too drugs, naturally
making more innovative research more lucrative and more attractive to the drug industry.
D. How much “research” is not really research?
Building on the point that NIHCM is trying to make, not all of the expenditures that PhRMA classiﬁes
under the term R&D go into new drug development. According to HHS, PhRMA spent thirty-one percent
of revenue on sales and marketing and administration, twenty percent on proﬁt, and just thirteen percent
on R&D.307 Families USA did a similar study based on SEC ﬁlings and calculated a split of twenty-seven
percent/eighteen percent/and just eleven percent for R&D.308 Avorn writes that the claims of R&D “risk”
that the industry makes belie its consistently high proﬁts, averaging about 17 percent per year.309
Some R&D undoubtedly bears the ﬁngerprint of the marketing department.310 A Bristol-Myers Squibb
executive said that “‘the notion of marketing versus science is really a false dichotomy,”’ but one expert
on clinical trial design said that drug companies “‘put huge amounts of money in trials, which have to be
directed toward what stands a chance of being in their interests. . . . And their interests are, in general, in
danger of being in conﬂict with what are society’s interests.”’311 Although much of the research behind the
statin Pravachol was “groundbreaking,” the trial comparing it to Lipitor, which lowers cholesterol more, was
307See Avorn, supra note 96, at 205. The R&D total includes minimal chemical manipulations used for patent extension.
308See id. at 206.
309See id. at 227.
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2000, at A1.
311Id.
57“‘designed to test equivalence.”’312 The study was not powerful enough “to uncover true diﬀerences between
the two drugs”—testing which drug was better would be invaluable, but “‘it is not in any company’s interest
to sponsor that trial.”’313 Therefore, the current purchasing model does not create the proper incentives for
drugs to face each other in head-to-head scientiﬁc competition.
Phase IV studies of drugs already on the market are necessary to monitor safety, but “many—perhaps
most—are really, in the view of many critics, just excuses to pay doctors to put patients on a company’s
already-approved drug.”314 In 2001, doctors received about $7000 per patient enrolled in a clinical study.315
Other research may include oﬀ-label uses, which may be used for “‘educating’ doctors about any favorable
results.”316 Angell, as a former journal editor, also criticizes the quality of industry-sponsored research,
citing one study that found industry-sponsored studies are almost four times as likely to be favorable to a
company’s product.317
PhRMA members have had to pay hundreds of millions in settlements when money spent ostensibly for
research has violated the Antikickback Act. In 1996, Caremark International settled a $250 million suit for
allegedly giving physicians research grants in exchange for prescribing Caremark’s drugs.318 TAP Pharma-
ceuticals paid $290 million in criminal ﬁnes and $585 million in civil ﬁnes because of an alleged kickback
scheme involving billing Medicare for samples received for free.319 Additionally, Schering-Plough paid a
$345 million settlement for artiﬁcial inﬂation of the price of Claritin; the manufacturer paid an insurer for a
312Id.
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315See id. at 31.
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58meaningless data report instead of giving a rebate that could have decreased government reimbursement.320
Of course, the vast majority of the items PhRMA claims are research expenditures are not only legal but
also truly beneﬁcial R&D. However, it is also worthwhile to remember that not all research is created equal
when evaluating the possible eﬀects of reimportation on R&D.
E. What Reimportation Would Mean for Innovation
Avorn calls PhRMA’s argument for maintaining revenue the “research ultimatum,” and he concedes that
the industry does invest heavily—much of American medical research is now corporate, and much industry
research is high-quality.321 However, the drug industry opposes not just reimportation, but any kind of
regulation that would decrease its revenue, with the specter of decreased R&D.
Danzon warns that price regulation would decrease innovation inevitably. She said that proportional price
regulation, such as a system of international price comparisons, would create “incentives for the pharmaceu-
tical ﬁrm to target its research at less innovative products because at lower price levels, expected revenues
are insuﬃcient to cover the higher costs and greater risks of innovative products.”322 Biased price regu-
lation, which cuts the most innovative products more, undoubtedly would decrease innovation, as Danzon
suggests. Moreover, biased price regulation is almost inevitable because the most expensive drugs are the
ones singled out for price regulation most frequently.323 She admits that bias could in fact “be designed to
320Schering Plough to Pay $345 Million In Settling Claritin Overcharge Allegations, 9 Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA) 147
(Aug. 2, 2004).
321Avorn, supra note 96, at 198-99.
322Patricia M. Danzon, Pharmaceutical Price Regulation 49 (1997).
323See id. at 49.
59favor rather than penalize innovative products” but that this is diﬃcult in practice.324 Danzon also concedes
that UK-style proﬁt regulation, which permits a ﬁrm-speciﬁc rate of return on capital based on innovation
and other contributions to the British economy, in principle rewards innovation.325 Danzon concludes that
empirical evidence “is consistent with the prediction that regulation adversely aﬀects innovation,” although
the eﬀect on innovation is “hard to measure.”326 However, changes in real R&D expenditures cannot be
tied to speciﬁc regulatory acts, and the U.K. has enjoyed more than twice as high a percentage of R&D
expenditure as a percentage of total spending on drugs than the U.S.327 In reality, this has not resulted in a
great deal of innovation from the UK, although the much larger scale of the American drug industry might
yield diﬀerent results.328
Of course, there is no doubt that a large decrease in revenue would aﬀect innovation, but the picture may
not be as dire as the pharmaceutical industry predicts. As discussed above, R&D is not as risky as the
industry claims—the Oﬃce of Technological Assessment found “an excess 4.3 percent proﬁt over a drug’s
life cycle” over a normal rate of return, and “proﬁts by pharmaceutical manufacturers exceeded those of
companies in industries with similar risks by 2 to 3%. . . .”329 The Task Force estimated a two percent
decrease in drug companies’ revenues because of reimportation.330 This decrease of two percent in the U.S.
is approximately a 0.9 percent overall loss in global revenue, which would cause a 5.3 percent decrease in
global proﬁts (estimated to be 17 percent).331 The Task Force assumes that companies would decrease their
R&D expenditures in response, but they may rationally choose to maintain spending while decreasing other
324See id. at 51.
325See id. at 53.
326Id. at 58.
327See id. at 59-60.
328Part of the problem is that although price regulation could theoretically avoid hurting the drug industry, the industry is
suspicious that the government would preserve its long-term commitment. See Richard G. Frank, Government Commitment
And Regulation Of Prescription Drugs, 22 Health Affairs 46, 47 (2003).
329Stuart O. Schweitzer, Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy 25 (1997).
330See Task Force Report, supra note 32, at 83.
331See id.
60parts of the budget, whether proﬁts or marketing or administration.
The Task Force extrapolated the eﬀect on R&D from three diﬀerent pharmacoeconomic papers, trying to
adjust for the methodology each author used. The Task Force had to use several assumptions in making
its calculations, so they cannot be considered completely precise. However, taking for granted that drug
companies would decrease R&D proportionately, the methodologies led to an estimate of a decrease in R&D
of 1.7 percent, 2.6 percent, or 3.2 percent.332 These methodologies may not have been applied completely
fairly, however. In all three cases, the Task Force uses an assumption of a two percent decrease in revenues.
However, its own calculations suggest a 0.9 percent reduction in global sales/revenues. This would cut all
of the impact estimates in half. Furthermore, all of these estimates take for granted that reimportation will
decrease drug companies’ proﬁts. Again, the lack of data on the eﬀect of high drug prices on Americans has
the potential to disprove the presumption of harm to drug companies. If reimportation successfully lowers
prices, consumption may actually increase as patients no longer have to forego their drugs, maintaining or
even increasing drug companies’ proﬁts. In contrast, the Task Force assumes that the change in quantity
will be negligible because of price insensitivity.333
The Task Force then uses the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development’s estimates to distinguish post-
approval R&D, which “may increase sales, but does not generally produce products that oﬀer therapeutic
advantages comparable to those of NMEs [new molecular entities].”334 Depending on the estimate for
reduction of R&D from the three methodologies, reimportation would reduce R&D spending on NMEs
332See id. at 84.
333See id. at 89.
334Id. at 85.
61by $570 million to $1.1 billion a year. Using the DiMasi drug cost estimate, the Task Force estimates
approximately 0.44 to 0.85 new drugs would not be introduced each year.335 In any event, a decrease in the
introduction of an NME every year or two may be a worthwhile tradeoﬀ for signiﬁcantly increased access to
existing drugs. This type of judgment was outside the scope of the Task Force Report but may be a rational
policy choice.
Angell is one of many critics of the drug industry who believes that it will maintain R&D even if there is
a drop in revenue. The largest drug companies made proﬁts of fourteen to eighteen percent of sales from
2001-2003, compared to a mean for non-drug companies of three to four percent.336 She concludes: “In fact,
whether price regulation would cut into R&D would depend entirely on whether the industry wanted it to....
As long as proﬁts are consistently higher than R&D costs, drug companies cannot make a case that reduced
drug prices would necessarily cripple research and development.”337 She says that “there is no particular
reason to think that R&D costs, no matter what they are, have anything to do with drug pricing.... the
industry will charge whatever the traﬃc will bear, and it has little to do with R&D costs.”338 Scherer
replies that while it is true that R&D expenditures are sunk, there is a “linkage” between cost of R&D and
prices.339 Also, the proﬁts that she relies on are accounting proﬁts; economists would count R&D as assets
and depreciate them.340
335See id. at 86. Again, the $800 million ﬁgure is probably an overestimate, which would double the impact on new drug
development. However, the apparent overestimate of loss of proﬁt roughly balances these errors.
336See Angell, supra note 43, at 11.
337See id. at 49.
338Id. at 51.
339Scherer, supra note 61, at 929. Another economist, however, states that for “short-run pricing decisions, ﬁxed or sunk R&D
costs are essentially irrelevant.” Berndt, supra note 49, at 55.
340See Scherer, supra note 61, at 929. However, this does not take the tax beneﬁts companies receive for their R&D expendi-
tures. This matters because the accounting-economics diﬀerence is critical to Scherer’s conclusion that the drug industry’s use
of proﬁts follows a “virtuous rent-seeking model.” See F.M. Scherer, The Link Between Gross Proﬁtability And Pharmaceutical
R&D Spending, 20 Health Affairs 216, 220 (2001).
62Public Citizen also claimed that the proﬁts of the top ten drug companies increased thirty-three percent even
during the recent economic slowdown, suggesting that a reduction in rates of return would have “minimal”
eﬀect on “innovative R&D” if companies so desire.341 Furthermore, lower prices would increase demand; a
1999 Merrill Lynch study found that a cut of forty percent in drug prices for Medicare beneﬁciaries would
lead to only a 3.3 percent decline in proﬁts because of increased demand.342 Public Citizen points out that
European companies have been both proﬁtable and innovative despite price or proﬁt controls.343 Finally,
advertising “is growing faster than R&D,” and when faced with the choice, it is “counterintuitive that the
industry would reduce R&D.”344
Similarly, Light and Lexchin conclude that lower drug prices would have minimal eﬀect on R&D and point
out that research has been increasing worldwide.345 They also contend that the U.S. accounts for ﬁfty-one
percent of global sales and ﬁfty-eight percent of global R&D but discovers only forty-three percent of the
“more important new drugs,” meaning that the free rider problem actually goes in reverse of conventional
wisdom.346 Based on the fact that eighteen percent of R&D goes to basic research for “breakthrough drugs”
and the rest goes “to derivative innovations on existing drugs and to testing,” PhRMA has engaged in
“Blockbuster Syndrome: the lure of monopoly pricing and windfall proﬁts for years spurs the relentless
pursuit for drugs that might sell more than $1 billion a year, regardless of therapeutic need or beneﬁt.”347
341Public Citizen, Would Lower Prescription Drug Prices Curb Drug Company Research & Development?,
http://www.citizen.org/print article.cfm?ID=7909 (last viewed Mar. 7, 2005). In fact, shifting PhRMA’s priorities appears to
be one of the main pluses for reimportation, according to Public Citizen.
342Id.
343See id.
344Id.
345Donald W. Light & Joel Lexchin, Will Lower Drug Prices Jeopardize Drug Research?, 4 Am. J. of Bioethics W1 (2004).
Canada’s Patented Medicine Prices Review Board published a study claiming that total R&D spending in Canada by brand
name drug companies increased ﬁfty-one percent from 1995 to 2000 despite price controls, but the total level and level as a
percentage of sales remained low. See Patented Medicine Prices Review Board, A Comparison of Pharmaceutical Research and
Development Spending in Canada and Selected Countries 4, PMPRB Study Series S-0217 (Dec. 2002), at http://www.pmprb-
cepmb.gc.ca/CMFiles/ss-0217e14HCB-492003-5262.pdf.
346Light & Lexchin, supra note 345, at W1.
347Id. at W2.
63The authors claim that a decrease in American prices of up to one-half would be possible without hurting
R&D “unless executives decided to cut them in favor of marketing, luxurious managerial allowances or high
proﬁts. They probably would not because R&D gets such favorable tax treatment, but this is as large an
assumption as Danzon’s or the Task Force’s—just in the opposite direction.348
The economists’ consensus is that R&D would probably decline with decreased drug company proﬁts from
reimportation. However, as Harvard economist F.M. Scherer asked, “‘The tough question is, how many
important new drugs would we lose? And what you would lose on average is products at the margin
that probably don’t make a diﬀerence between life and death.”’349 Quinn concurs, arguing that the R&D
argument against reimportation is “a false alternative. The payday for ﬁnding, say, a cancer cure is so huge
that no one’s going to hang it up.”350 She acknowledges that R&D would “slow” but says that we should
ask, “Who is all this splendid medicine for?”.351 Despite Scherer’s conﬁdence, this is not a policy decision
to be made lightly. While the drug industry’s rhetoric might have some logical gaps, the economic realities
of decreased proﬁt still remain.
348Id. at W3. Light and Lexchin conclude that the U.S. industry has “accounted for less than or about the same as its
proportionate share of international new drugs” and that “price competition has been the greatest spur to innovation for over
200 years.” Id.
349Greider, supra note 50, at 60.
350Quinn, supra note 43, at 31.
351Id. (emphasis in original).
64Part VI. The Future of Reimportation
As one of multiple possible approaches to increasing Americans’ access to
medication, reimportation has gained signiﬁcant political momentum. At the
same time, political and legal roadblocks—ﬁrmly backed by the strength of
PhRMA—make the actual passage and implementation of reimportation an open
question despite its political popularity.
A. Political Obstacles to Reimportation
One practical obstacle to drug price decreases is the inﬂuence of the drug industry in Washington. For
instance, some critics of the drug industry viewed the avoidance of bulk buying in MMA as a “bonanza.”352
The drug industry has around seven hundred lobbyists and spent about $478 million on lobbying from 1997
through 2002, according to Public Citizen.353 PhRMA is also beginning to concentrate more lobbying atten-
tion at the state level, spending a projected $49 million in 2003.354 The New York Times pointed out how
Elizabeth Helms, a former hair stylist who testiﬁed before Congress that drug stores and not drug makers
were responsible for high drug costs, worked for Citizens for the Right to Know, an alleged consumer group
actually founded with PhRMA seed money.355 In 1999, the top ﬁfteen drug companies spent almost $60
million for direct inﬂuence, as well as setting up “seemingly independent groups that promote their agenda,”
such as Citizens for Better Medicare and the Alliance for Better Medicare.356 Focusing on the importance
of research has been critical to PhRMA’s success on the Hill, so much so that in 1994, the former Phar-
maceutical Manufacturers Association became the “grammatically awkward” Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America.357 Furthermore, PhRMA has saturated the pharmacoeconomic ﬁeld, so it is “dif-
352Angell, supra note 43, at 194.
353See id. at 198.
354See id. at 214.
355See Jeﬀ Gerth & Sheryl G. Stolberg, Cultivating Alliances, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 2000, at A1.
356Id.
357Id.
65ﬁcult to ﬁnd independent research on pharmaceutical pricing.”358 The Center for Policy Alternatives claims
that in addition to its federal campaign, PhRMA also launched “phony citizen campaigns” in Maryland,
Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Carolina, Virginia, and Washington state.359
Despite PhRMA’s power inside of the Beltway, recent events have fed a negative public image of drug
manufacturers regardless of the value of many of their products. The revelations about COX-2 drugs, which
have created criticism of the drug industry and FDA, only added to the ﬁrestorm. Documents showed that
Merck canceled a study on Vioxx that was to determine heart risks, and preliminary results of an earlier
study indicated that Vioxx bore signiﬁcant risks almost a year before Merck withdrew it.360 The outcry
over COX-2 drugs led to a three-day-long FDA panel on the drug class.361 Merck has taken heavy criticism
for withdrawing Vioxx too late, and hundreds of lawsuits have been consolidated into one massive product
liability case that may lead to $30 billion in total liabilities.362 After the initial outcry, Vioxx may soon
return to the market, but FDA recently persuaded Pﬁzer to withdraw Bextra.363
FDA also had to scramble against charges that it suppressed dissenting voices that expressed concern about
Vioxx.364 Critics said that FDA had performed its job less well as its independence from PhRMA has
eroded in recent years. The Prescription Drug User Fee Act resulted in FDA’s “slashing its laboratories
and network of independent drug safety experts in favor of hiring more people to approve drugs—changes
358Id.
359Greider, supra note 50, at 147.
360See Barry Meier, Merck Canceled an Early Study of Vioxx, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2005, at C1; Barry Meier, Earlier Merck
Study Indicated Risks of Vioxx, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 2004, at C1. Other COX-2 drugs, Celebrex and Bextra, have also come
under scrutiny. See Andrew Pollack, A New Trial of Celebrex, and Questions on Its Timing, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 2004, at
C1.
361See Gardiner Harris, Medical Panel Poses Pointed Questions to Drug Makers Over Risks of Painkillers, N.Y. Times, Feb.
17, 2005, at A22.
362Alex Berenson et al., Despite Warnings, Drug Giant Took Long Path to Vioxx Recall, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 2004, at A1;
Barnaby J. Feder, Federal Panel Consolidates Vioxx Suits, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 2005, at C1.
363Gardiner Harris, FDA Announces Strong Warnings for Painkillers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 2005, at A1.
364See Gardiner Harris, FDA Leader Says Study Tied to Vioxx Wasn’t Suppressed, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 2004, at C9.
66that arose under an unusual agreement that has left the agency increasingly reliant on and bound by drug
company money.”365 The agency has responded to shrinking appropriations by cutting back on all but new
drug reviews, and it is commonly agreed that FDA does not satisfactorily review postapproval data.366 Some
believe that this has created a culture “‘in which the agency feels it can’t pressure drug makers.”’367 The
user fee agreement resulted from continuing pressure, especially from advocates pushing for fast approval of
HIV/AIDS drugs, but it has led to unintended consequences.368 After the COX-2 controversy arose, JAMA
and others called for a body to monitor safety independent of PhRMA and FDA,369 and new questions
about FDA arose in December after a deﬁbrillator recall raised questions about “shortcomings” in FDA’s
regulation of devices.370 FDA recently capitulated, agreeing to “create an independent board” to direct
agency response to “aggressively monitor the safety of drugs on the market.”371 For the ﬁrst time, oﬃcials
not involved with initial approval would take part in postapproval monitoring, and FDA also pledged to
inform the public more actively.372 Drug companies also agreed to make more data about clinical drug trials
available, and some members of Congress want to force drug makers to register all of their trials.373
Another recent political development has been the Bush Administration’s attempt to earn the cooperation
of Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin’s government in shutting down Canadian drugs. Based on con-
versations started during a trade visit in late 2004, Canada is now “considering three possible methods of
reducing imports: prohibit doctors from cosigning American prescriptions, prohibit pharmacies from ﬁlling
365Gardiner Harris, At FDA, Strong Drug Ties and Less Monitoring, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 2004, at A1.
366See id.
367Id.
368See id.
369See Denise Grady, Medical Journal Calls for a New Drug Watchdog, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 2004, at A1.
370Barry Meier, Flawed Device Places FDA Under Scrutiny, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 2004, at A1.
371Marc Kaufman, FDA Plans New Board to Monitor Drug Safety, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 2005, at A1.
372See id. Former FDA chief counsel Daniel Troy expressed concern that FDA should not forget the beneﬁt of drugs at the
same time as it monitors safety, and he worried about a chilling eﬀect on drug reviewers. See id.
373See Barry Meier, Drug Industry Plans Release Of More Data About Studies, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 2005, at C4; Barry
Meier, Bill Aims to Force Drug Makers To Register Trials of Products, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 2004, at C2; Barry Meier, A Top
Republican to Oﬀer Drug Data Bill, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 2004, at C3.
67prescriptions unless an American is present in Canada, and establishing a list of drugs that can be restricted
quickly in the event of shortages in Canada.”374 Some believe Canada has already made the decision to sell
drugs only to Americans physically present in Canada.375
Despite the documented value of its products, PhRMA is becoming increasingly isolated from other in-
dustries, especially as those former allies’ health care costs continue to rise. After a meeting with other
manufacturers, industry representatives said: “‘They said, “We’re the new Marlboro Man.””’376 Drug costs
have aﬀected governments below the federal level, as well. Greider states that over twenty states “have
considered legislation to allow state governments to negotiate with drug manufacturers for supplemental
rebates to state Medicaid programs.”377 One author, while opposed to drug importation, concludes that
Tauzin must “convince industry CEOs to settle for somewhat lower proﬁt margins, in exchange for making
what Murray rightly called ‘a national treasure’ a respected industry once again.”378
B. Legal Obstacles to Implementation
The Task Force pointed out that reversing reimportation’s illegality and providing a safe mechanism of
operation do not address other legal issues that will arise. Although these legal issues can be resolved
through appropriate legislation, they increase the complexity of reimportation, and the resulting litigation
374Christopher Rowland, A Turning Tide, Boston Globe, Jan. 5, 2005, at D1.
375See John Chase, Canada May Cut Oﬀ Drugs Via Mail, Net, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 6, 2005, at C1.
376Greider, supra note 50, at 147.
377Id. at 150. Harrison believes that drug companies have not won domestically because “a more cost-conscious federal
government has become directly involved in the delivery of health care,” the demographics of the aging population, and the rise
of generics. One key turning point came in the 1960s, when Senator Estes Kefauver held Hearings on Administrative Prices.
However, the thalidomide scandal shifted these hearings from their original focus on economics toward drug safety, resulting in
stringent FDA review that required the industry to reorganize and ensured that larger, higher-funded ﬁrms would survive more
readily. Moreover, the step up in FDA safety requirements created “a more pronounced split between imitators and innovators.”
Harrison, supra note 214, at 3–4, 50–51.
378Morton M. Kondracke, Drug Industry Must Change Its Ways To Improve Its Image, Roll Call, Dec. 6, 2004.
68could increase reimportation’s costs.
Allowing relabeling of foreign products could violate trade name or trade dress intellectual property rights,
making the scheme vulnerable to a takings challenge.379 Furthermore, the Tariﬀ Act of 1930 makes it
“generally unlawful to import into the U.S. any merchandise of foreign manufacture if the merchandise or
any part, such as the label, package, or wrapper, bears a trademark owned by a U.S. company ... unless
the written consent of the trademark owner is produced.”380 Although there is arguably little monetary
value to the label itself, Congress would either have to create an exception to the intellectual property law
or change the FDCA’s label requirements. The latter approach would almost certainly be easier to stomach
for Congress because it feels less like government seizure of company’s property. One possibility would be to
modify the identity requirement to allow a label that contains the drug’s scientiﬁc but not brand name. Of
course, opponents of this provision would point out that this modiﬁcation of the U.S. labeling requirement
could lead to patient confusion and improper fulﬁllment of the label’s purposes. Furthermore, according to
Gamut Trading Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, if the diﬀerences between the foreign and domestic product
are “material,” then the manufacturer may be able to exclude foreign drugs with identical trademarks but
diﬀerent compositions.381 Congress might have to legislate around this issue along with the modiﬁed labeling
requirement, and the pending bills in fact do so. An imported drug’s label satisﬁes FDCA requirements if it
has a copy of the labeling approved “‘without regard to whether the copy bears any trademark involved.”’382
Other causes of action could include patent or copyright infringement suits against importers and distributors.
379See Task Force Report, supra note 32, at 31.
380Id. at 94.
381200 F.3d 775, 778–79 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
382Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act, S. 334, 109th Cong. § 4 (2005) (amending FDCA § 804(g)(3)).
69U.S. patent law currently does not create exhaustion upon foreign ﬁrst sale; Congress would have to create
an exception for reimportation, perhaps by instituting a rule of international exhaustion, as Japan does.383
Furthermore, patent law does not prohibit manufacturers from adding provisions to contracts preventing
resale to the U.S., and drug companies would almost certainly turn to this strategy.384 This modiﬁcation
to patent law would not necessarily violate TRIPS, although it could be slightly embarrassing given the
U.S.’s role in pushing such universal protection for IP rights on the rest of the world. Several proposed
reimportation bills do take the step of introducing a limited form of exhaustion for imported drugs.385
Furthermore, copyright protections might govern the label, but these causes of action are unlikely to be
signiﬁcant.386
Non-intellectual property causes of action also may arise, perhaps leading to defensive measures whose costs
would then pass down to the patient.387 Tort claims against the drug companies currently include problems
with the distribution chain (such as mislabeling, misbranding, adulteration, or improper dosing), defective
packaging design, failure to warn, and strict liability for a manufacturing defect.388 If reimportation were
instituted, litigation risks might increase for all actors in the distribution chain. Drug manufacturers may be
jointly and severally liable with parts of the distribution claim outside U.S. jurisdiction, unfairly leaving them
on the hook.389 Exporters and importers may be liable for improper storage and transportation, although
383See Ako S. Williams, International Exhaustion of Patent Rights Doctrine, 7 Detroit J. of Int’l L. & Prac. 327 (1998)
(discussing the Supreme Court of Japan’s decision in Jap-Auto Products v. BBS Kraftfahrzeug Technik, Case No. Heisei 7(wo)
1988, Hanrei Jiho (Sup. Ct., July 1, 1997)).
384See, e.g., Task Force Report, supra note 32, at 96.
385For instance, S. 334 § 4(d) says it is not “‘an act of infringement to use, oﬀer to sell, or sell within the United States or to
import into the United States any patent invention under Section 804. . . that was ﬁrst sold abroad by or under authority of
the owner or licensee of such patent.”’ Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act, S. 334, 109th Cong. § 4(d) (2005)
(adding 35 U.S.C. § 271(h)). S. 16 mirrors this language, as does S. 109. See, e.g., Pharmaceutical Markets Access Act, S. 109,
109th Cong. § 8 (2005).
386See Task Force Report, supra note 32, at 94. The Task Force warns that the ﬁrst sale doctrine might not apply because
MMA required drug companies to allow relabeling for free. A modiﬁed labeling requirement would avoid this constitutional
question.
387See id. at 99.
388See id. at 101–102.
389See id. at 103.
70they may defend themselves by showing that the defect existed when it left the manufacturer’s hands.390
Depending on the jurisdiction, pharmacists may be held liable for failure to warn if they do not inform
the patient that their drugs are imported.391 Because the U.S. defendants may be forced to pay plaintiﬀs
despite the fault of foreign defendants, liability may increase. On the other hand, joint and several liability
is not universal, which could alleviate the burden on companies but also provide incomplete compensation
for victims.392 Plaintiﬀs wrongly injured also may ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to win, and the case could be moved
to a foreign country or require costly foreign discovery.393
Manufacturers and other members of the distribution chain may adjust by choosing carefully whom they
deal with and taking other quality-control measures; this might increase price, but it also would make
reimportation safer, which is one of the purposes of tort liability. Congress could intervene with legislation
to limit joint and several liability on domestic companies when foreign companies are unavailable, or it
could make submission to American jurisdiction a condition of certiﬁcation as a drug importer/exporter.
Alternatively, Congress could create a fund to compensate patients injured because a drug is reimported,
using part of the fees collected from registered importers and exporters as well as federal savings from
reimportation.
In the end, if reimportation goes through, these concerns all possess legislative solutions as long as politicians
have the will. As discussed above, Congress could also look at other countries and decide that certain
countries’ approval and labeling systems satisfy U.S. requirements. By doing so, the focus for maintaining
390See id. at 102–103.
391See id. at 103.
392See id. at 106.
393See id. at 105–106.
71safety would then shift to guaranteeing the integrity of the chain from foreign manufacturer to foreign
pharmacy to the U.S. distribution system. In the end, the complexity required to develop a workaround for
reimportation will cut even further into the cost savings, and policymakers interested in easing the burden
of drug prices on Americans will have to consider the costs of navigating this legal thicket.
Part VII. Existing Legislation Could Provide Leverage on Drug Pricing
Therefore, the two principal objections to the legalization of reimportation
have both strengths and weaknesses. Making reimportation safe is possible, but
it undeniably requires signiﬁcant start-up costs and adjustments throughout the
drug distribution chain. These start-up costs have the potential to vitiate almost
all of the decrease in prices for patients. Reimportation, like any method of de-
creasing prices for Americans, also has the potential to cut revenues if volume of
sales does not increase to compensate. At the same time, drug companies appear
to have considerable ﬂexibility to make sure that decreased revenue will not af-
fect R&D expenditures in a way that harms the most crucial type of innovation.
Before moving on to a ﬁnal consideration of the wisdom of reimportation, it is
appropriate to look at alternative interventions that may signiﬁcantly impact
the prices Americans pay for their drugs.
A. Hatch-Waxman and the Availability of Generics
Drug pricing signiﬁcantly changed in the 1980s after the Hatch-Waxman Act increased the popularity of
generic drugs. Hatch-Waxman allows the brand-name company to extent its patent protection beyond
twenty years because of delays in regulatory review.394 The extension equals the length of the review period
with certain exceptions.395 At the same time, Hatch-Waxman encourages the entry of generics by creating an
39435 U.S.C. § 156(a) (2005). The Hatch-Waxman Act is formally known as the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). Its provisions are codiﬁed at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2005) and
35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2005).
395Id. § 156(c) (2005). The statute also provides for the method of calculating the length of the regulatory review period. See
72abbreviated application for new drug approval (“ANDA”), which has lighter requirements than a New Drug
Application (“NDA”). The ANDA requires that the drug have the same active ingredient(s), the new drug
be bioequivalent to the listed drug, and the labeling be the same as the approved labeling.396 Importantly,
the generic applicant also must make one of four certiﬁcations for each applicable patent: that the patent
information has not been ﬁled, that the patent has expired, of the date the patent will expire, or that the
patent is invalid or will not be infringed.397 The ANDA goes through immediately after a Paragraph IV
certiﬁcation unless the patent holder brings an infringement suit; this infringement suit automatically triggers
a thirty-month stay against the generic without any prior judicial review.398 As a reward for pursuing an
ANDA, the ﬁrst applicant receives a 180-day exclusivity period, which it may lose for failure to market.399
The statute requires FDA to publish and make available a list of drugs with the relevant patent information,
which is commonly known as the Orange Book.400 FDA does not review the validity and legitimacy of the
patents listed in the Orange Book.401
Some drug manufacturers have found ways to avoid competition from generics, or at least to forestall it as
long as possible to prolong their monopoly proﬁts. In practice, the brand-name manufacturers take advantage
of this law “by cramming the FDA’s ‘Orange Book’ with late-listed or bogus patents, which then form the
basis of patent-infringement cases against ﬁrms trying to sell a generic.”402 Slowing down the ﬁrst generic
competitor buys additional time for monopoly proﬁts.403 Drug companies sometimes extend their exclusive
id. § 156(g).
396Id. § 355(j)(2) (2005).
397See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2005).
398See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). This stay ends if litigation results in a ﬁnding of patent invalidity or either infringement
or noninfringement. See id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)–(IV).
399See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)–(5)(D).
400See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(A). FDA requires brand name companies to list in the Orange Book patents that claim the drug
or a method of using the drug “that is the subject of the new drug application or amendment or supplemental to it” if a claim
of patent infringement is “reasonable.” 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b).
40159 Fed. Reg. 50338, 50343 (Oct. 3, 1994); 54 Fed. Reg. 28872, 28910 (July 10, 1989).
402Greider, supra note 50, at 32.
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73period by getting FDA approval for “new uses,” which the drug has may have been used for oﬀ-label for
years, or by switching patients to an on-patent, essentially-identical drug.404 Drug makers apparently have
paid generic rivals to hold oﬀ on their launch, as well.405 Avorn argues that the patent system has twisted to
become a driving force for noninnovative research. Besides allowing PhRMA to delay generic entry, current
patent law also has “allowed patents to proliferate on sometimes trivial details of the way the drug is made,
miniscule changes in its formulation within a tablet or capsule, even its appearance,” and the use of chemical
shortcuts.406
The New York Times examined the ﬁght over Hytrin as one illustration of how companies stall generics.
Zenith Goldline, a generic manufacturer, argued that “‘Abbott makes a million dollars a day for every day
it keeps us oﬀ the market,”’407 but its concern for the public welfare was short-lived, as it soon agreed to
a contract that would pay it $2 million a month (up to $42 million) not to produce the generic. Another
generic manufacturer, Geneva, agreed to a contract for $4.5 million a month, up to $101 million.408 In fact,
records suggest that the company did not rush the drug to market but instead called Abbott to negotiate a
settlement; as the ﬁrst to market, Geneva also enjoyed a six-month period of exclusivity to hold oﬀ Zenith.409
The article shows how Hatch-Waxman could be twisted not to bring generics to market sooner but instead
to delay them. As a result, thirteen private plaintiﬀs ﬁled antitrust lawsuits against Abbott over Hytrin,
pointing out that Abbott “ﬁled numerous additional patents . . . improperly listed a Hytrin patent in the
Food and Drug Administration’s registry, according to a federal appeals court.. . [and] ﬁled lawsuits against
404See id. at 34–35.
405See id. at 37.
406Avorn, supra note 96, at 224–25.
407Sheryl G. Stolberg & Jeﬀ Gerth, Keeping Down the Competition, N.Y. Times, July 23, 2000, at A1.
408See id.
409See id.
74ﬁve generic manufacturers, and countersued a sixth.”410 Although Abbott never won any of these cases, it
successfully extended its monopoly for four years, about $2 billion of mostly-proﬁt revenue.411 According
to the article’s authors, tamoxifen, Cardizem CD, K-Dur, and Cipro also may have been the subject of
similar agreements.412 FTC ﬁnally stepped in, and Abbott and Geneva “signed a settlement with the
F.T.C. agreeing not to make any other similar deals.”413 Not only did all the litigation give the brand name
manufacturer monopoly proﬁts for several more years, it also pushed up the cost of bringing the generic to
market, in turn increasing the price of the generic.414
FTC made a detailed study of ﬂaws in the generic drug market and released a ﬁnal report that recommended
allowing only one automatic 30-month stay per drug product per ANDA and passing legislation requiring
brand name and generic drugmakers to submit copies of certain types of agreements between them.415 It
found that Paragraph IV certiﬁcation had grown in frequency, and the brand-name company—not the generic
manufacturer—initiated seventy-ﬁve percent of patent litigation.416 However, the brand name manufacturer
has won only twenty-seven percent of cases that have gone to a court decision.417 FTC discussed the
many Paragraph IV-related settlements, although it declined to comment on the competitive eﬀects of these
settlements.418 Besides padding the numbers of patents, drug companies also list patents in the Orange
Book after ﬁling of the ANDA—FTC notes that many of these claims have been dubious.419 Finally, FTC
410Id.
411See id.
412See id.
413Id.
414See id.
415FTC, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration ii, vi (2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.
416See id. at 10, 13.
417See id. They nevertheless frequently sue subsequent manufacturers ﬁling ANDAs as well. See id. at 18.
418See id. at 25. Nevertheless, FTC has brought cases against manufacturers making potentially anticompetitive agreements.
Settlements include supply, licensing, and brand payment agreements. See id. at 28. Agreements also took place between
generic manufacturers. See id. at 37.
419See id. at 40. Moreover, there is no private right of action to have a patent delisted. See id. at 44, citing Andrx Pharm.,
Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323 (Fed Cir. 2001).
75noted that fourteen of the twenty agreements it reviewed had the potential to “‘park”’ at least part of the
180-day exclusive period of the ﬁrst generic applicant, “thereby preventing FDA approval of any eligible
subsequent applicants.”420
This has led to attempts to reform the Hatch-Waxman Act in recent Congresses. For example, the Senate
passed S. 812 in 2002, which would have closed many of the loopholes in Hatch-Waxman.421 In the next ses-
sion, it passed a similar bill, S. 1225, which limited brand name companies to one thirty-month stay, allowed
generic companies to ﬁle counter-claims, and caused forfeiture of 180-day exclusivity for anticompetitive be-
havior.422 Although these provisions have not become the law, the success of these Senate bills suggests that
interest remains high in making Hatch-Waxman an even more eﬀective vehicle for encouraging generic drug
entry. Furthermore, FDA published a rule in 2003 limiting NDA holders to one thirty-month stay for each
ANDA.423 Although a step toward cheaper, faster generic competition, this rule does not have the full scope
of reforms that S. 1225 did, and it does not prevent brand name companies from utilizing the thirty-month
stay against successive generic manufacturers. It also does not address the anticompetitive concerns raised
by FTC, suggesting that further legislation may be necessary to ensure a rapid, full transition to low-price
generic availability once the patent term expires. The full bargain of Hatch-Waxman grants fuller extension
of patent monopoly in exchange for rapid genericizing of the market, a fundamental part of the Task Force’s
emphasis on shifting drug consumption to utilize generics more.424
However, these claims are still subject to antitrust law. See id. at 45. Please see id. at 48–49 for a list of post-ANDA registered
patents and for the multiple stays they have triggered.
420Id. at 58. PhRMA also may ﬁle citizen petitions against generic drug approval, although antitrust scrutiny may be
hampered because of Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and they appear not to have slowed down generic entry. See id. at 65–68.
421Press Release, Senate Passes Groundbreaking Schumer-McCain Generic Drug Bill, July 31, 2002, at
http://schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/press releases/
PR01124.html (last viewed Mar. 1, 2005). However, the parallel House bill, H.R. 1862, failed. See Consumer Project on Technol-
ogy, The Hatch-Waxman Act and New Legislation to Close Its Loopholes, at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/generic/hw.html
(last viewed Mar. 1, 2005).
422Greater Access to Aﬀordable Pharmaceuticals Act, S. 1225, 108th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2003).
423Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,676 (June 18, 2003). The rule also prohibits listing
of patents on packaging, intermediates, or metabolites in the Orange Book as a way to delay generics.
424Task Force Report, supra note 32, at xi.
76B. The New Medicare Drug Beneﬁt: No Antidote to Price Increases
In addition to its provisions on reimportation, MMA added Medicare Part D, a prescription drug beneﬁt,
for the ﬁrst time. Multiple critics of the program’s cost have urged implementation of price control features,
which opponents characterize as government price control. The coverage begins in 2006, allowing eligible
fee-for-service Medicare recipients to enroll in a prescription drug plan (“PDP”) and setting up Medicare
Advantage plans, a type of managed care plan also oﬀering a prescription drug beneﬁt.425 The PDPs have
a premium plus a $250 deductible and must meet a certain standard or be actuarially equivalent.426 The
deductible’s annual increase is tied to the cost of covered Part D drugs, not the historically lower cost-of-living
or inﬂation.427
The coverage has an initial coverage limit of $2,250 (including the deductible) in 2006.428 Medicare will pay
for seventy-ﬁve percent of the cost between the $250 deductible and the $2,250 cap.429 However, it then
has a so-called “doughnut hole” in its coverage—after the initial $2,250, the next $2,850 in coverage (up
to $5,100 in cost) is the enrollee’s responsibility.430 The statute terms this provision “protection against
high out-of-pocket expenditures,” but the $3,600 annual out-of-pocket expenses are likely to be a signiﬁcant
burden. Furthermore, all of these dollar values will increase each year; the Kaiser Family Foundation has
calculated that the catastrophic threshold—now $5,100—will be $9,066 in 2013.431 After drug costs have
425See MMA, Pub. L. 108-173, § 101.
426See id.
427See id.
428See id.
429See id.
430See id. The statute says that the catastrophic coverage will kick in after the enrollee has paid $3,600 out-of-pocket. This
includes the $250 deductible, twenty-ﬁve percent of the next $2000 ($500), then 100 percent of the next $2,850.
431See Kaiser Family Foundation, Out-of-Pocket Spending in 2006 for Medicare Beneficiaries Under New Medi-
care Legislation, at http://www.kﬀ.org/medicare/
medicarebeneﬁtataglance.cfm (last viewed Apr. 15, 2004).
77passed $5,100, the enrollee will have to pay the greater of a $2 to $5 copayment or ﬁve percent of the cost.432
There are additional protections for the poor elderly up to 150 percent of the poverty line.433
The prescription drug beneﬁt is largely administered through a PDP sponsor, a risk-bearing entity that
operates in service regions.434 MMA requires at least two plans to be available in each region to harness the
beneﬁt of private-sector competition; at least one of the plans must be a PDP.435 MMA also provides an
enormous subsidy to insurance companies oﬀering a Medicare Advantage plan, providing a $10 billion-plus
“stabilization fund” to “provide incentives” for plan entry and retention.436
Critically, the statute says, “In order to promote competition under this part,” HHS “(1) may not interfere
with the negotiations between drug manufacturers and pharmacies and PDP sponsors; and (2) may not
require a particular formulary or institute a price structure for the reimbursement of covered part D drugs.”437
MMA also explicitly exempts the Medicare drug beneﬁt from the “best price” requirement in the Medicaid
statute.438 The legislation expects competition between plans to decrease the cost of drugs.439 In fact, this
private negotiating may preserve innovation incentives better than government negotiating because only the
latter can force “savings on brand-name drugs that have little competition,” which means less reward for
the drugs that usually are most-innovative.440 Avorn predicts that increased coverage will lead to increased
432See MMA, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 101 (2003).
433See id.
434See id.
435See id.
436Id. § 221(a).
437Id. § 101.
438See id. § 103. The best price requirement means that the government pays “the lowest price available from the manufacturer
during the rebate period to any wholesaler, retailer, provider, health maintenance organization, non proﬁt entity, or governmental
entity within the United States.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8 (2004). MMA also requires pharmacies to disclose prices for equivalent
generic drugs. See MMA, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 101.
439See MMA, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 222(a). Economists point out that “private pharmacy-beneﬁt managers can obtain most
of the savings that would be available through direct government negotiation.” Richard G. Frank, Prescription-Drug Prices,
351 NEJM 1375, 1376 (2004) (concluding that the likely result of drug importation would be the movement of international
drug prices toward a single price per product).
440Frank, supra note 439, at 1376. Frank also points out that the drug beneﬁt is “unique among health care services within
78promotion and increased use of the most expensive products regardless of eﬀectiveness.441 The drug beneﬁt
“almost totally ignored the need to improve the appropriateness and cost-eﬀectiveness of what doctors
prescribe,” and the federal government’s massive infusion of cash “regardless of [drugs’] clinical or economic
value . . . seemed destined to channel more and more dollars into the costliest (and hence most aggressively
marketed) products.”442
Recent developments have raised the possibility that Medicare Part D’s non-interference provisions could
be reversed, but the prospects for actual change are slim. In the immediate aftermath of MMA’s passage,
Medicare’s chief actuary, Richard Foster, said administration oﬃcials threatened to ﬁre him if he did not
hold down the cost estimate below $400 billion. 443 Just after MMA, the cost estimate was revised up to
$534 billion, and the ten-year cost estimate now stands at $1.2 trillion, with savings and oﬀsets reducing the
cost to the government to $720 billion.444 This enormous expense has triggered more scrutiny of measures
to decrease the burden of increased drug prices on both the government and elderly individuals.445 While
Democrats called for a congressional investigation, some Republicans said Congress should reconsider the
drug beneﬁt, and others “renewed their calls for allowing the importation of U.S.-approved drugs from foreign
countries, and for allowing the federal government to negotiate costs with drugmakers.”446 Republicans
would like to exclude higher-income seniors from the beneﬁt or to cap spending for the new program, and
the Medicare program, in which the government sets physicians’ fees, hospital rates, and nursing home reimbursements.” Id.
at 1375.
441See Avorn, supra note 96, at 411.
442Id. at 219.
443See Ceci Connolly & Mike Allen, Medicare Drug Beneﬁt May Cost $1.2 Trillion, Wash. Post, Feb. 9, 2005, at A1.
444See id.
445Moreover, the libertarian Cato Institute indicated that the White House’s assumed savings might not materialize, resulting
in signiﬁcantly higher actual costs. See Rick Klein, Cost Estimates Fuel Debate Over Medicare Drugs, Boston Globe, Feb.
10, 2005, at A1. On the other hand, the higher cost mostly results from including a full ten years of the drug beneﬁt, while the
other ten-year estimates included the two lower-cost phase-in years. See id.
446See Charles Babington & Ceci Connolly, Democrats Call for Medicare Drug Inquiry, Wash. Post, Feb. 10, 2005, at A2.
79other legislators want to prohibit coverage of “‘lifestyle drugs.”’447 On the supply side, “[s]eparate bipartisan
coalitions of lawmakers said they hope the higher cost estimate will help eﬀorts to legalize the importation
of cheaper medications from Canada and force Medicare administrators to bargain with drug companies for
lower prices.”448
Many high-powered Senators are leading the price-lowering eﬀorts, including Senators McCain, Snowe, and
Kennedy. McCain described the ban on government-negotiated prices “‘egregious and outrageous,”’ a “‘glar-
ing, disgraceful example”’ of PhRMA’s inﬂuence on Congress.449 The pressure for reform is especially strong
because the President’s “major policy prescriptions would leave his successor with massive ﬁnancial com-
mitments that begin rising dramatically the year he relinquishes the White House,” a type of “‘shadow
budget.”’450 However, the President “threatened to veto any changes Congress tries to make to Medicare’s
new prescription drug beneﬁt,” although even Republicans “long skeptical of the administration’s estimates”
view the White House’s “credibility on this issue” to be signiﬁcantly damaged.451
C. PhRMA’s Preference: Having Others Pay More
Part of PhRMA’s agenda has always been to increase the prices that other countries, who currently utilize
price controls, pay for their products. Kolassa argues that disparities between countries “will not be tolerated
447See Klein, supra note 445, at A1; Robert Pear, Estimate Revives Fight on Medicare Costs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 2005, at
A20.
448Klein, supra note 445, at A1.
449Pear, supra note 447, at A20. McCain said “the latest cost estimate would increase pressure on Congress to allow drug
imports.” Id. Senators Wyden and Snowe introduced a bill directing HHS to negotiate prices, and Senator Charles Grassley
signed on to co-sponsor a bipartisan bill “to allow imports by individuals, pharmacies, and drug wholesalers.” Id.
450Jonathan Weisman & Peter Baker, After Bush Leaves Oﬃce, His Budget’s Costs Balloon, Wash. Post, Feb. 14, 2005, at
A1.
451AP, Bush Threatens to Veto Changes to Medicare Prescription Drug Beneﬁt, Feb. 11, 2005, at
http://us.cnn.com/2005/ALLPOLITICS/02/11/bush.medicare.ap/ (last viewed Mar. 7, 2005).
80for long.”452 He proposes as a solution that “the price levels of pharmaceuticals in southern Europe be
brought up to approach those in northern Europe and the United States. Failure to address this disparity
will eventually lead to a downward adjustment of prices in the nations of northern Europe and North
America.”453 Now, the drug industry has found a steadfast ally in the White House. The current head of
CMS, Mark McClellan, has stated that developed nations around the world are not paying their fair share
for drugs.454 The U.S. drug industry has succeeded domestically in avoiding price controls, and it now “is
trying to roll them back overseas, with help from the administration and Congress.”455 As a strategy, some
critics believe that this represents “‘a terrible extension of the ineﬃciency and inequity of our own system”’
and that the U.S. should change its own drug distribution system, not other countries’.456
Grant Aldonas, the Commerce Department Undersecretary for International Trade, testiﬁed before the Sen-
ate Finance Subcommittee on Health Care that easing of foreign price controls would “‘not necessarily”’ lead
to decreased American prices.457 Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Josette Sheeran Shiner “acknowledged
that the administration lacks leverage in negotiations with other countries because nothing in international
trade law ‘prohibits price controls.”’458 A commentator at the generally anti-price control American En-
terprise Institute admitted, “‘There’s no obvious way for the U.S. to take action against other nations that
have price controls.”’459
In fact, the recent U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement almost became the ﬁrst international agreement
452Kolassa, supra note 54, at 108.
453Id.
454See McClellan, supra note 102.
455Elizabeth Becker, Drug Industry Seeks to Sway Prices Overseas, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 2003, at A1.
456Id.
457AP, Higher Drug Prices Abroad May Not Lower Prices in the U.S., Oﬃcials Say, Apr. 28, 2004, at
http://medaccessonline.com/articles/index.php?articleID=354&
artcategoryID1=19.
458Id.
459John Carey, Drug R&D: Must Americans Always Pay?, Business Week, Oct. 13, 2003, at 38.
81reaching foreign price controls. USTR described it as the ﬁrst free trade agreement with speciﬁc provisions
for non-tariﬀ market access for drugs.460 Australia and the U.S. will establish a “Medicines Working Group
to discuss emerging health policy issues.”461 Australia agreed on “the importance of research and develop-
ment in the pharmaceutical industry and of appropriate government support, including through intellectual
property protection and other policies” and “the need to recognize the value of innovative pharmaceuticals
through the operation of competitive markets or by adopting or maintaining procedures that appropriately
value the objectively demonstrated therapeutic signiﬁcance of a pharmaceutical.”462 This includes trans-
parency to the extent “a Party’s federal healthcare authorities operate or maintain procedures for listing
new pharmaceuticals or indications for reimbursement purposes, or for setting the amount of reimbursement
for pharmaceuticals.”463 FDA and its Australian counterpart, the Australian Therapeutic Goods Adminis-
tration, also will cooperate to increase the speed of availability of medicines.464
Australia fought oﬀ many of the most aggressive IP protections that the U.S. pharmaceutical industry wanted
and stated that its pharmaceutical beneﬁts system will persist and drug prices will not increase—the changes
are only process changes.465 A draft proposal raised concerns in Australia, which employs reference pricing,
because U.S. wholesale prices are “at least 79 per cent to 306 per cent more expensive.”466 The Australia
Institute “concluded that prices of medicines could rise by 90 per cent for non-concession card holders and
460USTR, Questions and Answers About Pharmaceuticals, July 8, 2004, at http://www.ustr.gov/Document Library/Fact Sheets/2004/U.S.-
Australia Free
Trade Agreement – Questions Answers About Pharmaceuticals.html (last viewed Mar. 8, 2005).
461Id.
462Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004, U.S.-Australia, Annex 2-C, at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/Australia FTA/Final Text/asset upload ﬁle148 5168.pdf.
463Id.
464See id.
465Department of Foreign Aﬀairs and Trade, Australia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Pharmaceutical Beneﬁts Scheme (PBS)
Outcomes, at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/
negotiations/us fta/backgrounder/pbs.html (last viewed Mar. 8, 2005).
466Australia Institute, Comparing Drug Prices in Australia and the USA, July 25, 2003, at
http://www.tai.org.au/Publications Files/Papers&Sub Files/
Drug%20comparisons.pdf (last viewed Mar. 8, 2005).
82104 per cent for concession card holders if the pharmaceutical industry gets its way.”467 Interestingly, one
of the probable results of drug reimportation is the convergence of drug prices in the U.S. and in exporting
countries—therefore, reimportation may actually serve to raise prices in other countries through an economic
lever, rather than a political one.468
Multiple authors have discussed the success of drug companies in pushing intellectual property rights to
the forefront of American trade policy.469 Harrison has an interesting theory based on heresthetics, a
“political strategy of ‘structuring the world so you can win.”’470 He begins his book with a discussion of
former President Clinton’s statement that no American should have to go to Canada to get lower drug
prices. Although most people would take this to mean that American drug prices are too high, “to one
segment of the population the president’s message spoke of their own agenda: raise the price of prescription
drugs in Canada.”471 The drug manufacturers who would rather raise foreign prices have “shaped U.S. and
global public policy toward that latter option,” as demonstrated by former FDA Commissioner McClellan’s
speech.472
Most believe that “the political power of the U.S. research pharmaceutical industry made the imposition of
international intellectual property rights a foregone conclusion.”473 The industry succeeded because “the
generic drug industry had less political inﬂuence when the issue was the international theft of the research
pharmaceutical industry’s intellectual property than when the issue was the prices that U.S. consumers were
467Id.
468See Richard G. Frank, Prescription-Drug Prices, 351 NEJM 1375, 1376 (2004). However, foreign price controls still mean
that U.S. prices will still remain higher in the end. See Berndt, supra note 49, at 61. Furthermore, with many foreign
governments struggling to pay their health costs as well, this rise in foreign prices could have a deleterious eﬀect on health in
other countries, which is of course not a desirable result.
469See Harrison, supra note 214, at 9–10.
470Id. at 48.
471Id. at 1.
472See McClellan, supra note 102.
473Id. at 63. Harrison has a more-controversial view that PhRMA has weakened domestic power and has turned to foreign
policy solutions instead. However, few authors believe PhRMA has experienced weakened political power in the U.S., as
discussed below.
83charged.”474 However, the issue of drug reimportation brings the two threads of international policy and
domestic prices together and unites them in a way that PhRMA did not have to deal with previously. As
a result, PhRMA’s previously free reign in the area of international pharmaceutical policy may be facing a
novel challenge.
The success of the international agenda was a two-step process, beginning by “educating both lawmakers
and the public regarding the importance of the research pharmaceutical industry to the U.S. economy and
of intellectual property rights to that sector.”475 The drug industry then “began to lobby Congress to
revise U.S. trade law to incorporate the enforcement of intellectual property as a prerequisite for continued
unfettered access to the U.S. market.”476 As a result, the drug industry largely determined the scope
of the policy debate about international intellectual property rights. In 1984, the drug industry pushed
the debate from price to piracy, succeeding in securing its desired revisions to Section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974.477 Four years later, it got Congress to strengthen further the intellectual property measure,
now referred to as Special 301, which united USTR and PhRMA’s interests.478 USTR was to identify
countries that do not provide “adequate and eﬀective protection of intellectual property rights” or “fair and
equitable market access to United States persons who rely upon intellectual property protection.”479 The
government then used Special 301 ﬁrst against speciﬁc other countries and then as a way to force bilateral
treaties.480 Of course, a multilateral solution would be more eﬀective and more cost-eﬀective, and drug
manufacturers received the government’s cooperation in pushing intellectual property through the TRIPs
Agreement. Harrison suggests that an additional beneﬁt to PhRMA of the TRIPS strategy is the fact that
474Id. at 73.
475Id. at 80.
476Id.
477See id. at 82.
478See id. at 87.
47919 U.S.C. 2242(a)(1)(A)–(B) (1988).
480See Harrison, supra note 214, at 136–37.
84the U.S.’s commitment to intellectual property rights “ensured that future eﬀorts by the U.S. government
to impose restrictions on the intellectual property rights of pharmaceuticals would be violative of the WTO-
TRIPS,” suggesting that the government cannot “use compulsory licensing or parallel importing as a means
to control drug prices.”481
Part VIII. An Introduction to Quantitative Analysis of Drug Use
Thusfar, the paper has focused mainly on price-related concerns. Utilizing Bayh-Dole’s reasonable pricing
language, encouraging generic entry through enforcement of Hatch-Waxman, and government bulk-buying
are all ways to lower prices. However, none of them places an emphasis on transparency of drug prices to
patients and prescribers. A parallel problem, then, is to ﬁnd science-driven ways to make drug spending more
eﬃcient. Prescription drugs usually are the cheapest, most eﬃcient way to treat disease—the cost of drugs
may be high, but the cost of alternatives may be higher.482 Drugs simply are important to patient health.483
Therefore, capping payment or the number of prescriptions will not help with health costs. However, prices
are growing much faster than inﬂation, and drug spending is the “fastest-growing component of all American
health care costs, rising 13–19 percent per year and doubling between 1995 and 2002. This doubling occurred
during the same period that spending for hospital care went up by only a ﬁfth, and for doctors and other
clinical services by only a third.”484 Although the correlation is imperfect, drug costs have increased at a
much faster rate than improvements in computing, which has experienced vast progress with decreases in
481Id. at 190.
482Schweitzer, supra note 329, at 4. See, e.g., Richard G. Frank, et al., Quality-Constant Price Indexes for the
Ongoing Treatment of Schizophrenia 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10022, 2003) (ﬁnding a ﬁve
percent decrease in treatment costs per person from 1994 to 1999).
483See Avorn, supra note 96, at 195 (describing the ill-fated result of New Hampshire Medicaid’s decision to cap the number
of prescriptions paid for to three per patient).
484Id. at 217.
85cost.485 By comparison, other advanced nations have lower per-person drug expenses despite even larger
elderly populations in some instances.486 Among English-speaking nations, U.S. citizens reported highest
rates of side eﬀects, skipped doses, and inability to ﬁll prescriptions because of cost.487 Americans are thus
spending more on drugs but often get less—medical transparency can make this country’s prodigious drug
spending more eﬃcient.
A drug’s price is not intrinsic; instead, it is part of a “social and political construct” that relies on the interac-
tion of the industry, payers, and the government.488 Therefore, the question is how to reward drug companies
appropriately for the large amount of important, innovative research they do and how to avoid awarding
promotion of inappropriate drug use.489 Avorn calls this transparency challenge the third dimension, which
tries to answer if a drug is worth its cost—and if not, how much it is worth.
Avorn considers and rejects some potential cost-beneﬁt approaches for this kind of measure.490 First, he
rejects the human-capital approach, which makes its decision based on future productivity and resource
consumption—he argues that viewing humans, especially elderly humans, this way has been rejected as
morally unacceptable.491 Although this approach may be more applicable in a resource-deprived Third
World country, Avorn claims that this type of scarcity is not (or should not) be the setting in the U.S.
However, courts have to make these kinds of calculations all of the time in personal injury cases. Second,
Avorn disparages willingness to pay as a measure because the numbers vary so greatly depending on economic
485See id. at 222.
486See id. at 220.
487See id.
488Id. at 227.
489See id. at 233.
490See id. at 239.
491See id. at 242–43.
86status and because people are unable to determine abstract questions such as how much they are willing
to pay to reduce the risk of death from a disease from two percent to 0.7 percent.492 Schweitzer, on the
other hand, believes that economic measures of disease burden are generally well-established.493 He still also
acknowledges that calculation of monetary outcomes is frequently impractical, and a complete cost-beneﬁt
analysis requires consideration of both the direct and indirect costs.494
Because of these issues with cost-beneﬁt analysis, most health economists have moved to cost-eﬀectiveness
analysis.495 Schweitzer believes that when monetary calculation of the value of outcomes does not work, the
analysis shifts to cost-eﬀectiveness, where outcomes are in “real” terms such as cure rates.496 The problem
with cost-eﬀectiveness is that “the question one asks should be determined by the sort of answer one is looking
for.”497 Generally, Schweitzer concludes that cost-eﬀectiveness analysis ﬁts with the types of decisions made
in the health policy context. The purpose is to get the “price to the level that the [purchaser] feels the drug
is worth.”498 Cost-eﬀectiveness is not a cure-all for medical decisionmaking, but it does increase awareness of
trade-oﬀs as long as it avoids “tossing around numbers with little quantitative basis or pitting all treatments
for all diseases against each other.”499 Avorn suggests cost-eﬀectiveness to compare diﬀerent ways of getting
to the same clinical endpoint.500 It may at times be an oversimpliﬁcation, but it is a critical starting point
for rational drug policy analysis.501
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494See id. at 213, 215.
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496See Schweitzer, supra note 329, at 215. Although more accepting of cost-beneﬁt analysis than Avorn, Schweitzer acknowl-
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212. Also, indirect beneﬁts are diﬃcult to measure. See id. at 213.
497Id. at 216.
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87One measure, the Quality-Adjusted Life-Year (“QALY”), allows for cost-eﬀectiveness analysis to come up
with one “number,” but the task still remains to decide how much a QALY is worth. This contrasts with the
natural human reluctance to put a value on human life or health, as the value of extending a dying person’s
life or the complexity of medical decision-making deﬁes easy quantiﬁcation.502 Nevertheless, QALYs do allow
for head-to-head competition between members of a drug class.503 Australia, France, and Canada engage
in this type of analysis, but FDA only worries about eﬃcacy against placebo—these trials may not set up
realistic conditions, and the ability to pass this low bar may not be clinically meaningful.504
Avorn warns that medicine has compartmentalized itself into a “silo” mindset, which views each component
of health care as a self-contained whole.505 Accordingly, patient care will suﬀer “as long as health care
decisions are driven more by the short-term ﬁscal needs of speciﬁc payers than by the big-picture clinical
needs of patients.”506 Cost-eﬀectiveness analysis may not be able to make managers more far-sighted, but it
at least theoretically will show whether expensive drugs in the short-term are worth the long-term beneﬁts.
Furthermore, both Avorn and Schweitzer would doubtlessly agree that further development of quantitative
measures of drug prescribing and use is an essential part of plans to rationalize and improve health care.
Kolassa, a frequent collaborator with the industry, argues that many drugs are underpriced and that savings
from them are underappreciated. GlaxoSmithKline has begun to advertise that appropriate use of drugs
saves overall health costs, in accordance with this strategy.507 This powerfully reminds us that the fact that
502See id. at 259.
503See id. at 256.
504See Schweitzer, supra note 329, at 220–21. This paper discusses at which stage to implement cost-eﬀectiveness analysis
later.
505Avorn, supra note 96, at 261.
506Id. at 263.
507See, e.g., GlaxoSmithKline Advertisement, The Atlantic, Jan./Feb. 2005, at 109.
88Americans are experiencing some of the highest prices in the world is not necessarily a problem. Instead,
the question is how to ﬁnd prices that are fair to patients and manufacturers, reward companies based on
the scientiﬁc value of their drugs, and increase access to drugs that improve patients’ lives.
Part IX. The Transparent Future of American Drug Consumption
Although drugs are often the most cost-eﬀective way of treating disease and preventing clinical symptoms
from emerging, Americans frequently consume drugs in irrational ways, largely as a result of the current
delivery structure of the health care system. There are multiple alternatives, some radical and some very
piecemeal. In the end, however, the best way for American drug consumption to change is if it becomes
more transparent and more of a true market. This will exert competitive pressures on prices and on R&D,
both leading to fair prices and encouraging strong innovation.
A. Business Perspectives on Price Controls
Reformers have suggested many alternatives to reimportation, with the most aggressive one being the adop-
tion of a form of government price regulation, which almost every other nation employs. Several com-
mentators, especially those writing from a conservative, strongly pro-business, or strongly pro-free market
standpoint, have strenuously objected to price regulation of any form. John Calfee, who writes for the
American Enterprise Institute (“AEI”), wrote a short book linking high pharmaceutical prices to the “phar-
89maceutical revolution.”508 Calfee says that any sort of price control “is deeply misconceived and could
thwart today’s dramatic, but still incipient, advances in biological science and medical practice.”509 Calfee
notes that drug spending has increased worldwide, with price increases accounting for less than a quarter of
the increase and the main forces being increased volume and a shift to more expensive drugs.510 According
to Calfee, marketing and advertising—even if not based on scientiﬁc rationality—are beneﬁcial from the
economist’s perspective because they are revenue-maximizing.
Calfee argues that price controls create harms “more varied and extensive than most people realize.”511
First, he says that price controls will decrease research incentives, which is clearly a powerful objection.512
However, as discussed above in this paper, this harm may not be very signiﬁcant if pharmaceutical companies
allocate resources to maximize continued development of breakthrough drugs or if volume of sales increases.
Second, he makes an argument against price controls in general, which he claims will become entrenched
and overly complex.513 Calfee is at the far end of the spectrum, even criticizing a potential Medicare drug
beneﬁt (incorrectly, as it turns out) because it would inevitably lead to price controls and therefore was
“extremely dangerous.”514
508Calfee, supra note 293, at 1. AEI, a conservative thinktank, receives funding from the Lilly Endowment, which pharma-
ceutical manufacturer Eli Lilly ﬁnances. See Media Transparency, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
at http://www.mediatransparency.org/recipients/aei.htm (last viewed Mar. 21, 2005); Media Transparency, Funder: Lilly En-
dowment, at http://www.mediatransparency.org/
funders/lilly endowment.htm (last viewed Mar. 21, 2005). AEI’s members include or have included Vice President Dick Cheney
and his wife, Lynne Cheney, Kenneth Lay, and former FDA counsel Daniel Troy. See Patricia M. Danzon, Pharmaceutical
Price Regulation (1997), AEI information sheet.
509Calfee, supra note 293, at 2.
510See id. at 8.
511Id. at 45.
512See id.
513See id. at 49.
514Id. at 65.
90More helpful is the contribution from an author who already appeared in this paper. Danzon also wrote a
book published by the AEI on the topic of drug price regulation. She contends that the nature of pharma-
ceutical spending, where the R&D costs are sunk and marginal cost of production is fairly low, makes drug
prices a tempting target for regulation.515 By contrast, economics theory relies on Ramsey pricing (diﬀer-
ential pricing).516 This kind of pricing increases total revenue, but Danzon admits that “consumers’ true
willingness to pay is unobservable, so application of these principles in practice is necessarily imperfect.”517
According to Danzon, there are several types of drug price regulation in eﬀect around the world. France,
Italy, and Spain require pre-approval of prices, looking at international price comparisons, comparisons with
existing products, therapeutic merit, and contribution to the domestic economy.518 Canada has a diﬀerent
type of price control, utilizing a Patented Medicines Review Board to monitor new drug prices for being
“not excessive” and comparing the price to that of the median charged in several other countries.519 For
drugs with little or no therapeutic advantage, prices correspond to older existing drugs.520 Beyond this
national-level regulation is provincial regulation because provinces negotiate bulk discounts and establish
maximum prices.521 France also has looked at manufacturer-speciﬁc budgets, where manufacturers must
conform to a pre-set government spending amount.522 Reference price limits in Germany, the Netherlands,
Denmark, New Zealand, and British Columbia group drugs with therapeutically similar products then sets a
price for that class.523 The U.K. regulates proﬁts as well, leaving companies free to set initial prices as long
515See Patricia M. Danzon, Pharmaceutical Price Regulation 13 (1997).
516See id. at 11.
517Id. at 13.
518See id. at 16-17.
519Patented Medicine Prices Review Board, Annual Report 8–9 (2003), at http://www.pmprb-
cepmb.gc.ca/CMFiles/ar2003e30LWY-1062004-5966.pdf.
520Id. at 9.
521See Doug Levy, Rx For Savings, U.S.A. Today, July 26, 1995, at 1D.
522See Danzon, supra note 515, at 18.
523See id. at 19.
91as the total rate of return on capital does not exceed a certain number.524 These price controls have worked
to some extent, but growth in volume and the use of newer, more expensive drugs continue to increase the
amount spent on drugs.525
Foreign price controls all rely on an extensive government role in price-setting, testing, and purchasing;
although state and federal governments purchase a signiﬁcant volume of drugs through Medicare, Medicaid,
and the Federal Supply Schedule, the U.S. private market predominates. At the same time, even U.S. gov-
ernment price-setting or bulk-buying would not necessarily have to harm R&D signiﬁcantly—it all depends
on the price level that the legislation sets. U.S. drug prices may decrease fairly signiﬁcantly yet remain
the highest in the world, and they could reward the most innovative drugs with high use and payments.
Furthermore, the lowered U.S. prices could provide PhRMA leverage in having other countries relax their
price controls and pay prices more in line with their economic status. However, direct price regulation has
almost no chance of passage, even in very moderate form, because the drug industry rightfully suspects that
payments under even an enlightened price control system would remain vulnerable to political manipulation.
B. Changes in IP Law
Other commentators believe that alternatives to existing patent law would provide suﬃcient incentive for
524See id. at 21.
525See id. at 37. Danzon also claims that allowing parallel trade in drugs would create many long-term problems for the sake
of a short-term beneﬁt because price diﬀerentials reﬂect diﬀerent price controls, not “superior production eﬃciency.” Id. at 87.
Under this economic understanding, reimportation essentially imports other nations’ price controls, and the savings often go
to intermediaries instead of consumers. See id. at 89. Finally, she warns that manufacturers will respond by setting a uniform
price, which will beneﬁt consumers in higher-price countries but will make consumers in lower-price countries worse-oﬀ. See id.
at 87–91.
92innovation while lowering drug costs. These include direct government-driven innovation, purchase by the
government, or a reward system that compensates companies based on frequency of drug use and how much
their drugs improve quality of life.526 This would change the incentive to make patent-protected me-too
drugs, as well.527 For now, there is minimal support for changes to IP law, and PhRMA has “mustered
lobbyists to oppose such ideas.”528
One paper blames patent law for leading to “a parallel set of markets lacking price competition” and argues
that the only check on prices is fear of government intervention.529 The authors argue that the best way to
promote competition and improve the industry’s price structure is to make all or part of the drug industry
“generic” by allowing the government to acquire and license patents, and they also believe the government
should compete with ﬁrms for drug patents.530 The problem in terms of eﬃciency is that both the research
race “winner” and all of the “losers” fund their R&D out of their own drug winners’ revenues, so “a social
cost/beneﬁt analysis would not ﬁnd all of their parallel R&D eﬀorts to be an eﬃcient use of resources.”531
The government does not have the institutional capacity to develop drugs fully, so this approach would not
work unless the government adds signiﬁcant new funding to its drug development eﬀorts. Because this is
unlikely, the government would have to take money out of the essential basic research it funds. It also exerts
only an indirect inﬂuence on the noncompetitive part of the drug market, the post-research component.
More broadly, however, injecting competition into the drug market holds great potential to improve drug
consumption and, more importantly, patient health.
526See Eduardo Porter, Do New Drugs Always Have to Cost So Much?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 2004, at 5.
527See id.
528Id.
529Stein, supra note 295.
530See id.
531Id.
93C. Bringing About Change in Prescribing Patterns
A third point of reform focuses on the prescribing practices of doctors and expects them to act as gatekeepers
of rational drug consumption as part of their professional function. Presently, the drug industry has taken
over educating doctors about their own products as well as sponsoring a great deal of continuing medical
education.532 The COX-2 saga presented “the clearest instance yet of how the conﬂuence of medicine and
marketing can turn hope into hype.”533 Drug companies spend hundreds of millions on development but
also on advertising and “marketing and promoting the drugs to doctors.”534 As a result, drugs “have been
too widely prescribed to patients who could safely obtain the same pain beneﬁts from over-the-counter drugs
costing pennies apiece.”535 Some critics in fact believe that shifting consumption through medical trans-
parency is the most important factor in promoting rational drug consumption.536
Prior experience demonstrates that it is possible to shift from brand-name to generic drugs. For instance,
“Highmark Blue Cross Blue Shield and its PBM Merck-Medco recently launched a program to oﬀer doctors
generics samples. . . . Among the 1,700 physicians nationwide who received visits from a clinical pharma-
cist and access to the free samples, there was a 22-percent increase in generic prescribing within eighteen
months. . . .”537 Angell and Dr. Arnold Relman, both former New England Journal of Medicine editors,
opined in Newsweek that reimportation would be a start, but a “more important step toward controlling
drug costs is to break the medical profession’s dependence on the industry for instruction in the use of
532See, e.g., Greider, supra note 50, at 71.
533Barry Meier, Medicine Fueled By Marketing Intensiﬁed Trouble For Pain Pills, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 2004, at A1.
534Id.
535Id.
536See, e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, High Prices, New Yorker, Oct. 25, 2004, at 89 (“The core problem in bringing drug spending
under control, in other words, is persuading the users and buyers and prescribers of drugs to behave rationally. . . .”); Hall,
supra note 258 (citing “independent, data-driven drug assessment”).
537Greider, supra note 50, at 77.
94pharmaceutical products.”538 Shifting to generics was a core recommendation of the Reimportation Task
Force as well.539
Similarly, physicians have to prescribe in a way that resists direct-to-consumer advertising, because studies
show that almost half of those who asked for an advertised drug receive a prescription.540 Drug companies
also have succeeded in creating entire new markets, such as the medicalization of erectile dysfunction through
Viagra.541 In the wake of the Vioxx scandal, direct-to-consumer advertising endured close scrutiny once
again—advertising has made Nexium a blockbuster when it oﬀers minimal beneﬁts over its predecessor, and
COX-2 drugs were among the most heavily-advertised products.542 However, the White House and FDA
both spoke in favor of the advertising, and FDA is even considering relaxing its rules.543 Various economic
pressures on doctors make the advertising highly eﬀective, and the need to respect the First Amendment
make this a diﬃcult area for changing consumption patterns. Patients may beneﬁt from direct-to-consumer
advertising when it encourages them to access needed health care, but physicians ultimately need to make
the appropriate prescribing decision regardless of whether the patient wants the newest and “best” drug or
not.
Finally, the campaign to reform prescribing recognizes that “[i]ndividuals and systems don’t need more
drugs or fewer drugs. We need the right drugs, for the right people.”544 However, it is sometimes diﬃcult to
measure what the right drugs are objectively. Research has shown that studies “funded by the drug industry
538Arnold S. Relman & Marcia Angell, A Prescription For Controlling Drug Costs, Newsweek, Dec. 6, 2004, at 74.
539See Task Force Report, supra note 32, at 67.
540Kaiser Family Foundation, Understanding the Eﬀects of Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising, Nov. 2001, at
http://www.kﬀ.org/rxdrugs/loader.cfm?url=
/commonspot/security/getﬁle.cfm&PageID=13876.
541See Greider, supra note 50, at 117-18.
542See Stuart Elliott & Nat Ives, Selling Prescription Drugs to the Consumer, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 2004, at C1.
543See id.
544Greider, supra note 50, at 137.
95reported by far the best cost-eﬀectiveness ratios; those funded by health-care organizations reported by far the
worst. Unfortunately, such research is too complex to simply split the diﬀerence.”545 Government guidelines
have “proven intensely controversial and politically dangerous,” with the outcry against the Agency for
Health Care Policy and Research leading to the dropping of agency-issued guidelines.546 Yet Avorn claims:
“We are already spending enough on drugs in the United States to meet the pharmaceutical needs of every
man, woman, and child in the country.”547 Therefore, the solution to the drug access problem does not
necessarily require rationing, merely better use of money through wiser decisionmaking.548
A fundamental challenge to improving prescribing practices is the fact that the drug industry has aﬀected
them so deeply. For instance, manufacturers “have been quietly compiling resumes on the prescribing
patterns of the nation’s health care professionals. . . . These ‘prescriber proﬁles’ are the centerpiece of
an increasingly vigorous—and apparently successful—eﬀort by drug makers to sway doctors’ prescribing
habits.”549 A large body of literature also has proven that detailing aﬀects prescribing.550 PhRMA even
combines pharmacy data with physician information sold by the AMA, which makes about $20 million a
year from marketing the information.551 Using this information, PhRMA identiﬁes inﬂuential physicians
and invites them to participate in diﬀerent conferences and to receive consulting fees.552
545Id. at 139.
546See id. at 140–41.
547Avorn, supra note 96, at 265 (emphasis in original).
548See id. at 266.
549Sheryl G. Stolberg & Jeﬀ Gerth, High-Tech Stealth Being Used to Sway Doctor Prescriptions, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 2000,
at A1.
550See Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 283 JAMA 373 (2000).
551See Stolberg, supra note 549, at A1.
552See, e.g., id.
96D. Funding Medical Transparency
Making prescribing more rational represents the best “ﬁx” for the current debate about drugs and drug
prices, but it may turn out to be an even more diﬃcult solution politically than reimportation because of
the large number of actors who would have to change their practices. Furthermore, rational prescribing will
require massive investment in comparative research, and no one has the current responsibility of making this
information widely available.553 Avorn views drug comparison information as a “public good,” but he ne-
glects to mention the signiﬁcant free rider problem that his proposal would create.554 Later entrants into the
market would have no incentive to spend the money on comparative research unless various legal structures
and incentives either mandate or encourage their participation. Diﬀerent alternatives place the burden for
funding comparative research on drug companies, purchasers, the government, or some combination of the
three.
For instance, drug companies might have to prove superiority of their drug to the best-accepted existing
alternative to gain priority FDA review—the traditional concern about speed of approval becomes much less
powerful if drug companies are the ones classifying their own drugs. Under this system, more innovative
drugs enjoy longer periods of patent protection, increasing their returns. Other critics want FDA to employ
a “more continuous rating scale” than the binary safe and eﬀective or not.555 The current dichotomous
approval structure employs the licensure model, but FDA perhaps should switch to a certiﬁcation model,
where “a wide variety of qualities of service and product are allowed to be marketed given the condition
that consumers are informed of the quality standards attained.”556 After FDA approval or certiﬁcation,
the second stage of research would examine not only safety but also prescribing practice, patient use and
553See Avorn, supra note 96, at 363.
554Id. at 391.
555Schweitzer, supra note 329, at 232.
556Id. at 233. In other words, drugs could be marketed as superior to existing alternatives based on their FDA certiﬁcation
and presumably would be priced accordingly.
97compliance, adverse eﬀects, and outcomes.557
The natural question that arises here is how FDA should deﬁne superiority. Presumably, drug manufacturers
would have to do massive, expensive clinical studies before they ﬁnd the niche in the market where their
outcomes are better than existing alternatives. Even so, the question remains whether a better outcome in
some subgroup of patients truly indicates superiority in a head-to-head comparison. Another drawback of
this FDA approach is that while this may increase the reward for truly innovative breakthrough drugs, its
front-end costs also may decrease the number of drugs in a class or slow their entry, which could lead to
fewer treatment options for refractory patients and decreased price competition. FDA also might not be
institutionally capable of handling this task for a signiﬁcant amount of time.
Alternatively, the government could directly fund comparative research as part of its massive drug purchasing
through Medicaid, Medicare Part D, the VA, and the Department of Defense.558 Government funding could
combine with private eﬀorts—for instance, the government could give tax credits to insurers or employers
who contribute into a shared pool of comparative outcome data. Of course, this data pool also could include
voluntary cooperation by the drug industry. To perform this research, government and private purchasers
could either create their own research institutions or utilize private academic groups such as the Cochrane
Collaborative, a coalition that focuses on evidence-based medicine.559 However, Avorn warns that market
approaches to generating this information may not always work because of the complexities of medicine
557See id. at 383.
558Many other governments already employ this type of practice. For instance, Canadian provinces, which typically buy
drugs, utilize cost management tools, such as determining formulary inclusion by taking price and cost-eﬀectiveness into
account—furthermore, these prices are transparent, unlike in the U.S. market. Ontario and British Columbia utilize “clinical
evaluations of the drugs” from “an independent panel of physicians and pharmacists,” and there are exceptions based on medical
appropriateness. AARP Public Policy Institute, Issue Brief: Prescription Drug Prices in Canada, IB 62, June 2003, at 14–147,
at http://research.aarp.org/
health/ib62 can rx.html (last viewed Mar. 11, 2005).
559See Avorn, supra note 96, at 366.
98and the temptation for academic drug evaluators to be friendly to PhRMA to increase their own research
funding.560 The output of all this comparative research could be drug scores based on cost-eﬀectiveness for
a common outcome, suggested formularies based on eﬀectiveness and price, or an innovation scale for drugs
that represent signiﬁcant advances.
This postapproval comparative research, whether publicly or privately funded, would be incomplete without
supplemental educational programs for prescribing physicians. Federal and state governments; employers and
insurance companies; medical professionals, pharmacists, and other drug experts; and even brand-name and
generic manufacturers may jointly be able to fund programs that summarize comparative drug research and
present the information to physicians using the same continuing medical education and one-on-one detailing
methods that the drug industry has proven to aﬀect prescribing practice.561 In this type of postapproval
approach, the diﬃculty of deﬁning superiority is resolved because drugs may be compared both to other
members of their class and to other classes, as in ALLHAT.
Schweitzer believes that tiering in the health care system and in pharmaceuticals is inevitable—some will
want the highest quality and highest cost, while others will want the most cost-eﬀective therapy.562 However,
this presupposes that in medicine as in other commodities, such as cars, the most expensive therapy is the
best. ALLHAT has clearly demonstrated that this should be the focus of more intensive future research
because the cheapest pill, the generic water pill, outperformed all of the brand-name drugs. Similarly, the
COX-2 safety issue has reinforced the fact that the newest drug, while perhaps advertised and perceived as
560See id. at 369. If insurers view comparative cost-eﬀectiveness information as proprietary economic data to gain a competitive
advantage, then the beneﬁt will be quite limited—funding should instead come from insurers, employers, and the government.
See id. at 379. The scattered analysis done by managed care organizations is ineﬃciently duplicative and involves smaller
sample sizes. Avorn believes that federal funding would convince universities, HMOs, and contract research organizations to
participate in this kind of monitoring because they do not have to put up their own funds. See id. at 384.
561See id. at 394. Avorn experienced success with a new type of information transfer organization that used software,
educational outreach (akin to detailing), visits, critical overviews, and phone/e-mail consultation.
562See Schweitzer, supra note 329, at 228.
99being the highest-quality, may pose dangers not understood as well as those of older, cheaper drugs. It is an
unfortunate fact that physicians often prescribe the wrong drug.563 An cost-eﬀective, rational drug approach
might seem diﬃcult to attain now, but compared to the current system of “piecework” delivery, “perverse
incentives,” “absurdly high costs,” and “large numbers of uninsureds,” change is required, inevitable, and
best undertaken immediately.564
E. Is the Pharmaceutical Market a True Market?
Right now, the “market” in drugs does not actually fulﬁll many of the requirements of a real market. Mar-
ket analysts “typically note” that “pharmaceutical markets in particular[] do not satisfy many conditions
of competitive markets because costs are often paid by insurance, decisions about treatments are made by
physicians rather than by payers, and consumers lack information about the relative cost and eﬀectiveness
of therapeutic alternatives.”565 Marketing drugs is unique “because of the peculiar consumer-agent rela-
tionship characterizing health care demand,” and a patient gets the beneﬁt “but for approximately 80% of
expenditures, does not pay for it directly.”566 Unlike other parts of the health care system, drugs require
higher out-of-pocket expenditures, so patients are more price-sensitive.567 Even more importantly, “society
frequently makes inconsistent demands,” so it wants access to drugs and innovation.568 The drug market in
563See, e.g., Huang, E.S. & R.S. Staﬀord, Patterns in the Treatment of Urinary Tract Infections in Women by Ambulatory
Care Physicians, 162 Arch. of Internal Med. 41 (2002).
564Id. at 415.
565AARP, supra note 558, at 13–14.
566Schweitzer, supra note 329, at 6–7. At the same time, consumers pay a much higher percentage of the cost of drugs than
they do for other parts of the health care system, which leads to price sensitivity. See id. at 97. There is also a tremendous
asymmetry in the amount of information doctors and patients possess, and insurers heavily inﬂuence pharmaceutical demand
also. See id. at 80, 82.
567See id. at 8.
568Id. at 16.
100America is in fact
largely structured as a parallel set of imperfectly competing markets. (2) Costs are not
universally shared. Those with serious medical problems incur a disproportionate share of
the total spending, and what is a small part of national GDP becomes a large part of family
budgets. (3) Physicians, bearing no share of the cost, play a major role in determining in-
dividual purchasing decisions. (4) Fixed copayments shield individual users from sensitivity
to or knowledge of costs. (5) Opportunities for third-party payers, who bear two-thirds of
prescription drug costs, to exercise price discrimination are limited by ethical, political, and
liability concerns. (6) Access to prescription drugs is increasingly treated as a necessary
component of quality of life in the United States.569
Although ﬁrms compete with each other, the industry has a “unique structure” where “diﬀerent drugs with
similar goals compete for the same customers.”570 Insured customers do not make their decision based on
price, and advertising campaigns “are silent regarding price”—manufacturers even may avoid substantial
price reductions when generics enter.571 Therefore, the manufacturing and marketing sections are “parallel
noncompeting (more accurately, not engaging in price competition) divisions,” and at any given moment,
“the marketplace resembles many independent, highly inelastic markets, largely unaﬀected by competitors’
pricing decisions.”572
At the same time, R&D departments “operate in a highly competitive market,” so the “industry cannot be
classiﬁed as either competitive or noncompetitive.”573 A competitive marketplace would provide “consumers
with a steady ﬂow of new products at a price close to the cost of production,” but pharmaceutical R&D
competition does not accomplish this because it only “determines the slice sizes of a pie whose increasing
size is driven by the advance of science.”574 Therefore, the current system results in the industry’s enjoying
“a greater share of the total surplus their products generate than do producers in other industries, and
570Id.
571Id.
572Id.
573Id.
574Id.
101society suﬀers the deadweight loss attributable to reduced competition in its [manufacture and marketing]
sector.”575
Furthermore, drug companies enjoy tremendous inﬂuence over prices, making their behavior more like that of
a classic monopoly than would otherwise appear. Drug companies have slowly responded to the public outcry
over prices. Ten PhRMA members announced their participation in “a new program to cut 25 percent to 40
percent from the retail prices of prescription drugs sold to uninsured people of modest means younger than
65.”576 This obviously will provide some relief, although much of the price cut comes from pharmacies—the
drug makers’ subsidy amounts to ﬁfteen percent of list price.577 However, this piecemeal solution continues
the fragmentation of the system and does not encourage better, more rational prescribing. This episode
also demonstrates that the drug industry retains extreme control over pricing, despite contentions that the
market is not monopolistic. It held down price rises before the November 2004 Presidential election, and
it has subsequently raised them.578 Schweitzer describes the market as “oligopolist” instead of monopolist,
but he acknowledges that some segments are monopolistic.579
Additionally, the drug industry has had a “disproportionate inﬂuence over the demand” portion of supply
and demand, creating what Avorn calls an “astonishing mismatch between the way expensive drugs are used
and the way their pharmacology suggests they ought to be used.”580 There is no transparent market because
buyers of drugs do not “shop around and compare choices,” and society would have to be willing to accept
the fact that some will not be able to participate in the market, an assumption that is not valid for health
575Id.
576Robert Pear, Companies Set Program to Cut Prices of 275 Prescription Drugs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 2005, at A13.
577See id.
578See De Aenlle, supra note 53, at 7.
579Schweitzer, supra note 329, at 9, 106. Ultimately, Schweitzer concludes that demand-side factors are more important than
supply-side factors in determining price. See id. However, factors he describes as “demand-side” often bear the heavy inﬂuence
of the drug industry, such as perception of drug quality and the fractured drug market.
580Avorn, supra note 96, at 227.
102care.581 To redress this opacity, diﬀerent purchasers have begun to utilize their bargaining power more
eﬀectively, even as the government has refused to do so for Medicare. So far, “a dozen states have joined
purchasing pools in an attempt to use market power to reduce costs,” and thirty-seven require “Medicaid
recipients to use generic or lower-priced drugs.”582 Other states have ﬁled lawsuits against PhRMA, “saying
they defrauded state Medicaid programs by charging inﬂated prices,” and Oregon has begun conducting
comparisons between drugs of the same class and choosing based on price when therapeutic beneﬁt is
the same.583 To continue this commitment to transparency, the federal government also must monitor and
punish any anticompetitive behavior demonstrated by PBMs or brand name and generic drug manufacturers.
Private parties have become more active in this area as well, as a group of California pharmacies sued over
a dozen manufacturers for “conspiring to keep U.S. prices well above those for the same drugs in Canada
and other countries.”584
Large employers also are now cooperating to monitor PBMs, expecting to save “at least 6 percent, or
$50 million a year initially” through complete collection of discounts and manufacturer rebates.585 A PBM
executive welcomed the move—taken because PhRMA refused an earlier proposal to deal with the companies
directly out of preference for the PBMs—and said that “‘transparency in drug purchasing was becoming a
buzzword.”’586 The president of another group of companies considering a similar move noted, “‘If you don’t
know the true price of the drug, you can’t get there.”’587
581Id. at 230.
582Robert Pear & James Dao, States Trying New Tactics to Reduce Spending on Drugs, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 2004, at 27.
583Id.
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585See Milt Freudenheim, Employers Unite in Eﬀort to Curb Prescription Costs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 2005, at C3.
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587Id. Currently, the market is “highly segmented,” and there is no “common measure of wholesale price.” Schweitzer, supra
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103The move toward transparency does not reﬂect a larger trend toward consumer-driven health care; instead,
it shows demonstrates a commitment to medicine-driven health care. Drugs should compete with each other
based on their medical value, and they also should compete based on price. At the time of prescribing,
doctors and patients should both know the cost of the drug (the cost to the payer), the out-of-pocket cost
for the patient, and the cost of alternatives.588 This may require long-term adjustments to the information
technology infrastructure of the health care system because it is unrealistic for physicians to take a signiﬁcant
amount of time to make this kind of price determination. In conjunction with this price transparency,
purchasers (mainly the government, large employers, PBMs, and insurers) can utilize comparative scientiﬁc
data to engage in cost-eﬀectiveness, cost-beneﬁt, and cost-utility analysis. This economic analysis of what
diﬀerent drugs are “worth” enables comparison between members of a drug class and selection based on both
science and value. Injecting price consciousness will promote rationality at all levels of the drug purchasing
decisionmaking chain. The individual patient who knows what his or her drugs cost will pressure prescribers
to maximize use of less expensive drugs when medical beneﬁt is the same, and the patient will best be
able to determine which drugs are aﬀordable, increasing compliance.589 Physicians will be able to take a
big-picture view of drug costs and also will have the satisfaction of practicing scientiﬁcally-sound medicine.
Payers also beneﬁt because they can maintain health for patients while making drug spending more rational.
Finally, the U.S. drug industry, the most creative and successful in the world, will respond to the science-
based environment and ﬂourish by directing R&D to drugs that can win in one or both of the dimensions of
scientiﬁc validity and price.
588Also, patients should have ﬁnancial incentives to purchase drugs according to the transparency analysis. For instance, if a
patient chooses a drug based on non-medical reasons, such as advertising, when it has a cheaper, equally-eﬀective alternative,
then the patient should face a higher co-payment.
589Of course, insurance status is critical to the prices patients pay. One economist proposes that one way to lower the prices
that the uninsured pay is to create “purchasing groups that are equipped to bargain.” Frank, supra note 68, at 126.
104Conclusion: The Final Verdict on Reimportation
The Task Force warns that the real beneﬁt to patients from reimportation could be quite small. Its ﬁnal
estimate is a reduction in total drug spending of one to two percent, based in large part on the assumption
that intermediaries “would likely capture a large part of the price diﬀerences.”590 Using IMS Health’s
proprietary data, the Task Force reiterated CBO’s conclusion that total spending would enjoy only a small
decrease.591 At the end point, the patient “may get discounts of only 20 percent or less,” which still amounts
to $2 to $4 billion and may make a diﬀerence to patients, especially those who take multiple drugs.592
However, limitations on the utility of reimportation come from multiple factors. For instance, the total
volume of drugs might be quite small (around twelve percent according to the Task Force).593 First, drug
companies or foreign governments may decide to restrict exports. Second, drug companies could limit their
production because of their patent monopoly. Third, drug companies may consciously try to increase the
cost of reimportation by modifying labels or delaying the timing of product launches in foreign countries that
export drugs to the U.S.594 Furthermore, other countries have only a small percentage of the drug supply
that the U.S. does, as Australia has only 4.6 percent, Canada 10.2, France 12.4, Germany 15.1, Switzerland
1.2, and the U.K. 11.9.595
590See Task Force Report, supra note 32, at 65. The Congressional Budget Oﬃce also estimated a beneﬁt of
one percent. See CBO, Would Prescription Drug Importation Reduce U.S. Drug Spending? (Apr. 29, 2004), at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=5406&type=1.
591See Task Force Report, supra note 32, at 67.
592Id. at 67.
593See id.
594See id. at 77.
595See id. at 78.
105Already, Canadian internet drug exporters have experienced increasing economic pressures from Canadian
government oﬃcials “worried about the treat of liability lawsuits and the problem of maintaining an adequate,
reasonably priced supply of prescription drugs for their own population” and from PhRMA members that
“are threatening wholesalers who do business with them.”596 In response, Canadian drug exporters have
tried to reassure politicians that “they are interested only in ﬁlling the needs of uninsured and underinsured
Americans.”597 Nevertheless, the drug industry has already succeeded in stemming the supply of drugs from
Canada.598
An equally signiﬁcant obstacle is the role that intermediaries such as importers, exporters, and third-party
payers would play in the actual savings to patients. The Task Force extrapolated from European data, where
the savings to patients are also signiﬁcantly lower than the price diﬀerential.599 Intermediaries “will bear the
costs of searching for drugs in low-priced countries, and the sundry costs of keeping and managing inventory,
as well as shipping products to willing wholesalers, or retail pharmacies and hospitals in the U.S.”600 They
also will have to comply with the regulatory structure set up for commercial reimportation. The impact
on patient welfare therefore depends on the magnitude of the price diﬀerential, and estimates have varied
quite widely in this respect also. For the top-selling brand name drugs, the Task Force found a diﬀerence of
forty percent in 2003.601 Generic prices were cheaper for the most part in the U.S., but innovator/licensed
products were signiﬁcantly cheaper in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Poland, Switzerland,
and the UK.602 Despite the price diﬀerential, cost savings will decline with the massive start-up costs of
596Cliﬀord Krauss, Internet Drug Exporters Feel Pressure in Canada, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 2004, at A1.
597Id.
598See Rowland, supra note 374, at D1.
599See Task Force Report, supra note 32, at 69.
600Id. at 73.
601See id. at 70.
602See id. at 71.
106a reimportation system, which include registration, implementation of anti-counterfeiting technology, and
hiring of new personnel.
The question then becomes how to maintain an open supply of drugs to foreign countries in the wake
of nearly-guaranteed drug company interruption. Several of the reimportation bills pending in Congress
address these workarounds by introducing anti-discrimination principles or by prohibiting anti-reimportation
practices. S. 334 prohibits a manufacturer from either directly or indirectly discriminating by charging a
registered exporter or importer a higher price; restricting, denying, or delaying supplies; failing to satisfy
certain notice and application requirements; purposefully changing drugs for foreign distribution so they do
not conform to the U.S. version or violate good manufacturing practice; or entering into agreements designed
to delay or frustrate importation.603 FTC and states enforce these provisions, which do not apply either to
discounts or to charitable contributions.604 Similarly, S. 109 prohibits discrimination by charging a higher
price for exporters or importers; denying, restricting, or delaying them supplies; refusing to do business with
them; altering drugs’ foreign forms or violating GMP; or otherwise discriminating against reimportation in
FTC’s determination.605 Depending on which countries become accepted exporters of drugs, the governing
principles of the EU independently may prohibit discrimination because of rules ﬁning “ﬁrms that attempt
to control the volume of goods sold to individual countries.”606
Again, these bills demonstrate Congress’s determination to ﬁll as many of the foreseeable gaps as it can in any
603Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act, S. 334, 109th Cong. § 4 (2005) (amending FDCA § 804(n)(1)). Drug
manufacturers have an aﬃrmative defense if they can explain why they are not selling to registered importers/exporters or if
they must make the foreign version of their drug diﬀerent from the U.S. version. See id. (amending § 804(n)(2)).
604See id. (amending FDCA §§ 804(n)(3)–(5)).
605See Pharmaceutical Markets Access Act, S. 109, 109th Cong. § 9 (2005) (adding FDCA § 804(l)). This bill’s anti-
discrimination provisions are essentially the same as S. 334’s.
606Frank, supra note 468, at 1376. It is also at least in principle (although unlikely) possible that the lure of the American
market will be so great that drug manufacturers will not sell in Europe.
107reimportation bill. At the same time, these approaches raise diﬃcult policy and legal questions. Essentially
requiring companies to sell their products abroad so that they can be reimported could be viewed as an
overextension of Congress’s commerce clause authority as well as overreaching in general. It also may be
a “taking” of private IP, a complicated legal question outside the scope of this paper. The next question
is whether the government should allow the importation of non-U.S. drug versions simply to keep the drug
pipeline open for reimportation when there are so many alternatives to addressing the dysfunctions of the
American drug market. The potential risks of this approach may not be worth the savings to consumers
that will be left over after the middlemen take their cut.
Because of the start-up costs and costs of overcoming the drug industry’s resistance, the greatest value
of reimportation may be as a triggering device. Angell concludes that reimportation is just a “stopgap”
because “there is something absurd about buying drugs from Canada.”607 Families USA noted that reim-
portation is “not a long term solution” but is “ a step toward injecting real price competition and some
price transparency into the pharmaceutical market.”608 Many of the other approaches to cost containment
have failed or are stuck in neutral, including formularies, generic substitution, drug utilization review, dis-
ease state management, drug education, and hospital cost-containment programs.609 Fundamentally, the
popularity of reimportation demonstrates Americans’ desire to know the amount that they pay for drugs
and to take control of their own drug spending. Reimportation only oﬀers a half-solution because it does
not address prescribing practice, but it ﬁnally begins to shine some light into the comparative obscurity of
drug purchasing.
607Angell, supra note 43, at 226.
608Listening Session #1: Consumer Groups: Hearing Before the Task Force on Drug Importation 2 (2004) (statement of Dee
Mahan, Senior Health Policy Analyst, Families USA), at http://www.hhs.gov/importtaskforce/session1/familiesUSA.html.
609Schweitzer, supra note 329, at 174–82.
108Whether the solution is reimportation, or whether reimportation can trigger more rational policy changes,
the status quo probably cannot sustain itself for much longer. Even though the pace of growth in national
health spending slowed in 2003 to 7.7 percent, and even though prescription drug spending growth slowed
to 10.7 percent that year, the rate of increase in drug prices still outpaces overall health spending.610 The
slowdown came from a smaller increase in the number of prescriptions, greater use of generics, higher co-
payments, and conversion to over-the-counter status.611 Drugs still account for twenty-three percent of
out-of-pocket spending (versus eleven percent overall), and out-of-pocket payments increased faster in 2003
than 2002.612
This increase in expenditures is rational and health-maximizing as long as the drugs used are chosen scien-
tiﬁcally and purchased in a transparent market. However, for Americans to reap these health beneﬁts fully,
drug prices must reﬂect the result of scientiﬁc and value competition between drugs. Transparency creates
powerful new incentives by promoting price competition between therapeutically-equivalent drugs, increas-
ing use of aﬀordable generics, and making most-innovative drugs more proﬁtable. Although reimportation
is a well-publicized alternative, it would be only a partial accomplishment in this modernization project,
a feasible but relatively small ﬁrst step that the U.S. could skip if it generates the political will to make
transparency the guiding principle of its drug market.
610See Robert Pear, Nation’s Health Spending Slows, But It Still Hits a Record, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 2005, at A14.
611See id.
612See id. Furthermore, premium payments increased faster than beneﬁts and faster than people’s earnings. See id. In some
ways, the sensitivity over drug prices results from the fact that health insurance coverage in the U.S. works diﬀerently for drugs
and medical services. However, increases in the cost of drugs have consistently outpaced increases in costs for other parts of
the health care system.
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